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ARTICLES
THE APPRAISAL REMEDY AND THE




The appraisal remedy in corporate law confers upon share-
holders a statutory right to dissent from specified fundamental or
structural changes in the life of their corporation. The remedy re-
quires the corporation to facilitate the shareholders' withdrawal by
buying back their shares for fair value, or its equivalent,1 as deter-
mined through appraisal proceedings. When state law makes the
remedy available, a shareholder is able to translate dissent into ac-
tion by filing a timely objection and demand for payment and, if no
settlement with the corporation can be reached, beginning appraisal
proceedings in court.2 On the other hand, when the appraisal rem-
edy is not available a dissatisfied shareholder may suffer in silence,
sell shares at a price that may reflect buyers' similar disenchantment
with the plans of the corporation, or try to convince a court that the
corporation's agents have violated a duty in a way that should yield
monetary damages or prospective relief.3 The greater part of this
Article deals with the baffling question of when the appraisal rem-
edy is available. We argue that the details of availability, differing
as they do from state to state, both are suggested by and derived
from the goal or goals of appraisal statutes. Related questions-
such as how much payment an appraisal should yield a dissenting
* Associate Professor of Law, Gakushuin University (Tokyo).
** Professor of Law, University of Virginia. We wish to thank Michael Dooley,
Roberta Romano, and Robert Scott for their comments and suggestions.
1. See H. HENN & J. ALEXANDER, LAWS OF CORPORATIONS 1002 (3d ed. 1983);
W. CARY & M. EISENBERG, CASES AND MATERIALS ON CORPORATIONS 1456-62 (5th
ed. 1980).
2. See infra notes 53-105 and accompanying text.
3. See infra notes 22-34 and accompanying text.
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shareholder and whether its availability should affect the availabil-
ity of other legal remedies-will be addressed in light of the ap-
praisal remedy's purposes. Unfortunately, it is not easy to draw
conclusions from the ways in which the various state statutes make
appraisal available to shareholders. There are almost as many vari-
eties of appraisal statutes as jurisdictions. Declarations of the goals
or rationales of these statutes abound. While our aim in this Article
is to bring some order out of the chaos and then to suggest a more
sensible order, it is worthwhile to sketch first a brief history of the
commentary on appraisal.
The traditional view describes the appraisal remedy's emer-
gence as a protection developed for minority shareholders when the
law no longer required shareholders to consent unanimously to
changes in the contract of the corporate enterprise. 4 But the chro-
nology and causality between these two developments are not en-
tirely clear. Some commentators imply that legislatures
simultaneously abolished unanimity and substituted appraisal either
as a remedy for the dissenting shareholder who could no longer veto
the majority's will5 or, possibly, as a tool for the majority to dis-
suade courts from granting dissenters' requests for injunctions
against majority-willed changes.6 Some report a lag before this sub-
stitution was regarded as necessary. 7 Opinions differ over whether
appraisal statutes codified a judicial experiment or sprang from the
legislative chambers.8
4. See generally Carney, Fundamental Corporate Changes, Minority Shareholders,
and Business Purposes, 1980 AM. B. FOUND. RESEARCH J. 69, 77-94.
5. See Levy, Rights of Dissenting Shareholders to Appraisal and Payment, 15 CoR-
NELL L.Q. 420, 421 (1930); Note, Appraisal of Corporate Dissenters' Shares: Apportion-
ing the Proceeding's Financial Burdens, 60 YALE L.J. 337, 338 (1951); see also Lattin,
Minority and Dissenting Shareholders' Rights in Fundamental Changes, 23 LAW &
CONTEMP. PROBS. 307, 308-09 (1958); Manning, The Shareholder's Appraisal Remedy:
An Essay for Frank Coker, 72 YALE L.J. 223, 228-29 (1962); Weiner, Payment of Dis-
senting Stockholders, 27 COLUM. L. REV. 547, 547 (1927). But see Warren, Voluntary
Transfers of Corporate Undertakings, 30 HARV. L. REV. 335, 335-36 (1917) (asserting
that even common law rule vested power in majority).
6. See Manning, supra note 5, at 229 (noting way in which appraisal freed major-
ity from risk of injunction and wondering whether appraisal statutes consciously pro-
moted this end); see also Lauman v. Lebanon Valley R.R., 30 Pa. 42, 49 (1858) (court
creates appraisal remedy as alternative to dissenter's claim for injunction).
7. See Voeller v. Neilston Co., 311 U.S. 531, 535 n.6 (1941) ("Unanimous share-
holder consent was a prerequisite to fundamental changes. . . . To meet the situation,
legislatures authorized. . . changes by majority vote. This, however, opened the door
to victimization of the minority. To solve the dilemma, statutes permitting a dissenting
minority to recover the appraised value of its shares, were widely adopted.").
8. Compare Manning, supra note 5, at 246 n.38 (noting that Pennsylvania legisla-
ture took hint of appraisal from judicial creation) with M. EISENBERG, THE STRUC-
TURE OF THE CORPORATION 75 (1976) (noting that Ohio's appraisal statute predates
judicial creativity in Pennsylvania). We are unable to find any Ohio cases that would
have directly encouraged the Ohio legislature to enact primitive appraisal statutes in the
early 1850's.
430 [Vol. 32:429
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Moreover, this imbroglio includes a debate about the reason
for this protection-if it has been that--of minority shareholders.
Most observers have viewed the appraisal statutes as addressing a
kind of ex post fairness; the minority should be able to jump ship
when the master sends it in a new direction. 9 Over time the ex post
fairness view came under strong attack, especially by (then Profes-
sor) Manning. The attack was three-pronged: Appraisal is expen-
sive for the very shareholders it is alleged to protect, it puts undue
restraints on those corporations that may need to liquidate assets in
order to buy back the appraised shares, and no one was able to
distinguish rationally those events that trigger a right to appraisal
from those that do not.' 0 In short, the attack maintained that ap-
praisal delivered little fairness at odd moments and at high cost.
This attack may have been insufficiently sympathetic with dissent-
ers to see that uncertainty and costs for corporations might trans-
late into management's increased sharing of profitable opportunities
with passive investors." The attack was serious enough, however,
to force a notable commentator to agree with Manning that ap-
praisal is essentially an anachronistic remnant of the previous cen-
tury's concern for property rights, but to maintain that, whatever its
origins, appraisal may be worthwhile as the only "remedy of desper-
ation" available to minority shareholders.' 2 Other commentators
have preferred to rebuild from first principles and to ask why ap-
praisal has survived in an evolving world and under what circum-
stances parties would bargain for it.13
Since this Article seeks in part to join in the latter inquiry, it is
useful to summarize the nature and degree of appraisal's survival.
Appraisal remains firmly embedded in American corporate law,
and is a remedy available in every American jurisdiction 14 in at
least some settings. It is a remedy that apparently is meant to pro-
tect these shareholders in the face of contrary developments such as
9. See M. EISENBERG, supra note 8, at 75, 78. Most commentators view the
source of appraisal as fairness and not constitutional necessity; it is a right that admira-
bly protects "the minority against being involuntarily dragged along . Id. at 78;
see also Levy, supra note 5, at 421.
10. See Manning, supra note 5, at 232-44; see also Latty, Some Miscellaneous Nov-
elties in the New Corporation Statutes, 23 LAW & CONTEMP. PROaS. 363, 389 (1958)
(noting haphazard pattern of triggering transactions).
11. It is possible that appraisal was contemplated as a threat rather than as a recur-
ring reality. Such a threat might be appropriate if managers are viewed as possessing
both a good deal of inside information about the firm's opportunities and a means of
stripping passive shareholders of their share of these opportunities.
12. M. EISENBERG, supra note 8, at 83.
13. See Fischel, The Appraisal Remedy in Corporate Law, 1983 AM. B. FOUND.
RESEARCH J. 875, 881-87 (appraisal remedy's survival may suggest that its benefits
outweigh its costs).
14. See MODEL BUSINESS CORP. AcT ANN. § 80, 6 (Supp. 1977) (citing statutes
of 50 states and District of Columbia).
1985]
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legislative acceptance of cash-out mergers which force minority
shareholders out of enterprises.' 5 The evolution of appraisal stat-
utes has included retreats-perhaps in response to the famous at-
tacks' 6 -in the form of "market exceptions" that withdraw the
appraisal option when dissenters can use the stock market to trans-
form their shares into cash. That evolution, however, also has in-
cluded the expansion of appraisal remedies. Having emerged in the
context of consolidations,' 7 appraisal now often extends beyond
mergers for stock or cash alone to asset sales, charter amendments,
and even asset and stock purchases. One who tries to explain the
modem statutes and their exceptions might struggle not only with
the statutes' general characteristics but also with the very different
procedures that states have developed for valuing stock and with
the relationship between appraisal and fiduciary suits or other forms
of relief.18 As we shall see, conventional views of the goal of ap-
praisal inadequately explain the variety of appraisal statutes in ef-
fect. 19 In short, the continued spasmodic presence of appraisal in
state statutes appears more chaotic than ever. While commentators
bemoan the burdens that appraisal imposes,20 and imply that ap-
praisal does not do all that it might to protect minority sharehold-
ers, virtually no one offers suggestions to make it a more effective
tool.
In Part I of this Article we describe some views of the appraisal
remedy's potential goals. We introduce three of these goals-in-
cluding the conventional one (if the muddled history can be reduced
to a single view) attacked by Manning and taught to generations of
law students-and then put them aside since they fail to illuminate
current statutes. We then introduce three other goals which we find
15. See Weiss, The Law of Take Out Mergers: A Historical Perspective, 56 N.Y.U.
L. REV. 624, 642 & n.101 (1981) (citing JOINT LEGISLATIVE COMM. TO INVESTIGATE
UTILITIES, REPORT, Doc. No. 78, 159th Sess. 149 (1936), reprinted in 19 N.Y. Legis.
Documents (1936)).
16. See E. FOLK, REVIEW OF THE DELAWARE CORPORATION LAW FOR THE
DELAWARE CORPORATION LAW REVISION COMMITTEE 1965-1967, at 196-200 (rec-
ommending substantial abolition or reduction of appraisal rights because of muddled
theory, inconsistent treatment, availability of other remedies for fraud, and existence of
public markets).
17. See M. EISENBERG, supra note 8, at 75-76 (limited emergence of appraisal may
be explained by rarity of some fundamental changes in corporate structures and other
historical realities).
18. The discussion below leads to clear conclusions regarding the implications of
various goals or explanations of appraisal for valuation procedures. For a discussion of
prevailing approaches to this valuation question, see W. CARY & M. EISENBERG, supra
note 1; Fischel, supra note 13. The relationship between appraisal and other remedies is
taken up infra notes 129-30 and accompanying text.
19. See infra text accompanying note 24. And an even more modem and sensible
view of appraisal fails to explain the actual statutes. See infra text accompanying notes
25-29.
20. See Manning, supra note 5, at 230-31; Fischel, supra note 13, at 881-82.
[Vol. 32:429
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prescriptively and descriptively useful. We label them: in-
framarginality, reckoning, and discovery. In Part II we apply these
goals to representative appraisal statutes. No fit is perfect, but
many of the statutes appear remarkably more sensible and memora-
ble when viewed as means of achieving one of the suggested goals.
We shift to a more normative presentation in Part III when we
propose a new style of appraisal statute. We think this proposal is
of both substantive and methodological interest. Substantively, it is
designed to accomplish the "discovery goal," explained in Part I as
essentially a goal allowing shareholders to use the appraisal remedy
to uncover possible managerial misbehavior. In our view, share-
holders must be concerned about a variety of inside information
that we call "secrets"--corporate opportunities, discoveries, or dis-
appointments of which passive shareholders and public markets are
unaware-and must be concerned about agents whose conflicts of
interest lead them to undersell these secrets. Our "discovery stat-
ute" aims, therefore, to warn shareholders about such conflicts or
even discourage corporate transactions in which shareholders will
be so vulnerable. At a methodological level we suggest that ap-
praisal may have been underestimated or misunderstood because
drafters and courts sitting in review never have linked appraisal to
any particular goal of corporate law. Although we hardly insist on
Single-mindedness or neatness in statutory drafting or construction,
we think that many observers whose instincts are to support the
availability of appraisal will find it helpful to think of appraisal as
aimed at a specific goal. Thus, even if our discovery goal is not
shared, we think our methodology may be attractive.
I. THE CREDIBLE GOALS OF APPRAISAL
In this part we introduce some goals that might sensibly moti-
vate and guide the construction of the appraisal remedy. Part II
will use these goals to explain the many state appraisal statutes in
effect. Before describing the three credible goals on which we focus
in this inquiry, we sketch for comparison other views of the purpose
of the appraisal remedy that we do not pursue in this Article. This
history and the analysis which follows is concerned with the limited
puzzle of existing appraisal statutes. We accept appraisal as a fea-
ture of corporate law and do not hazard any guesses as to whether
the world would be better off without it. Similarly, we take certain
features of corporate law as given,21 and we do not address the
21. In particular, although we discuss the free rider problem that appears to be at
the core of any attempt to encourage constructive dissent to corporate decision-making,
e.g., infra note 46, it is quite clear that the following analysis, like corporate law itself,
slides over a variety of free rider problems. There appears to be a fair supply of dissent-
ers to many majoritarian (corporate and noncorporate) maneuvers even though one
1985]
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question of why the appraisal statutes evolved so differently in dif-
ferent jurisdictions.
A. The Purpose of the Appraisal Remedy-Background Views
1. Conventional View
The conventional view is built on the idea that appraisal stat-
utes have sought to protect minority shareholders. Under this view
minority shareholders gain the right to appraisal at the time of fun-
damental changes in their enterprise as a substitute for their former
right to veto such changes. Thus, appraisal retains the flavor of
minority veto power, since the minority shareholder can at least
veto his own continuing involvement in a "fundamentally different"
corporation.22
This view hardly needs another dismembering. It has been
correctly attacked as greatly overestimating the protection offered
minority shareholders who elect appraisal 23 and, more significantly,
as lacking explanatory power.24 For example, the conventional
view does not explain why many appraisal statutes contain a broad
market exception, allowing dissenting shareholders simply to sell
their shares in an active stock market and reinvest in what might be
close substitutes, while other statutes create an exception to the
market exception and make appraisal available when shareholders
receive cash in return for their widely traded stock. It is hard to see
why-and the conventional view does not tell us why-sharehold-
ers who receive cash are worse off and more in need of appraisal
than shareholders who receive stock of an acquiring or other corpo-
ration. More generally, the conventional view does not explain why
the various appraisal statutes so differ in detail and why such differ-
ent corporate changes trigger the availability of appraisal.
2. (Ex Ante) Group Coordination
In a recent article, Professor Fischel advanced a view of the
appraisal remedy that we find attractive but of limited descriptive
utility. 25 Fischel describes appraisal as an arrangement that share-
theoretically might imagine that every potential dissenter would wait for someone else
to bear the cost of dissent. Some aspects of this problem are taken up in Levmore,
Monitors and Freeriders in Commercial and Corporate Settings, 92 YALE L.J. 49 (1982),
but the ways in which corporate (and other) law sometimes-but only sometimes---
seems responsive to free rider problems are matters far beyond the scope of this Article.
22. See, e.g., Carney, supra note 4; Weiss, supra note 15.
23. See Manning, supra note 5, at 232-33 (noting the taxability of appraisal
proceeds).
24. See Fischel, supra note 13, at 877-78 (impossible to explain triggering transac-
tions in statutes).
25. Fischel, supra note 13.
[Vol. 32:429
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holders find appealing ex ante because they realize that an acquiring
bidder can one day try to profit from their lack of coordination.
Consider the familiar prisoner's dilemma problem where
shares of the target are selling at $50. A bidder then announces a
tender offer pursuant to which it will pay $60 for 51% of the
shares and simultaneously announces that the remaining shares
will be obtained in a freeze-out merger for $30. If one share-
holder could negotiate for all the shareholders, this offer would
be rejected because the pretransaction market value of the target
($50) exceeds the weighted average of the bid (approximately
$45). Each shareholder acting individually, however, may ra-
tionally conclude to tender at $60 to avoid receiving only $30 for
all their shares. Thus the offer might succeed (assuming no com-
petition from other bidders) even though shareholders as a class
are made worse off.
The appraisal remedy represents a solution to this prisoner's
dilemma problem. If the shareholders in the second step of the
transaction are likely to receive in excess of $40 in an appraisal
proceeding, a bidder who is only willing to pay $45 for all the
shares will not go forward. Thus the remedy protects all share-
holders from this value-reducing transaction and by decreasing
the probability of this negative outcome causes all shares to trade
at a higher price. 26
Unfortunately, this sensible "group coordination" view of ap-
praisal also lacks explanatory power. It does not begin to explain,
among other things, why Delaware's statute,27 which Fischel uses
illustratively, denies appraisal when the target's shareholders give
up widely traded stock and receive not cash or debt, but the ac-
quirer's stock or any widely traded stock. Nor does the group coor-
dination view, or the conventional view for that matter, explain the
availability of appraisal in many states, including Delaware, for
shareholders of an acquiring corporation that uses a significant
amount of its stock to acquire another corporation, unless the ac-
quiring corporation's stock is widely traded.28 Indeed, the group
coordination view does not, on its own, explain any appraisal stat-
ute, although it provides a sensible and sophisticated theoretical in-
sight that may be especially useful when coordinated with other
appraisal goals.29
3. Coattails
Shareholders might reason ex ante that in the event of an ac-
quisition, or other organic change affecting their corporation, their
26. Id. at 878-79.
27. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 262(b) (1983).
28. Id. §§ 251(c), 253, 262(b).
29. Each of the three views or goals introduced below and emphasized in this Arti-
cle is easily married to the group coordination idea.
19851
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investment's security lies in continuing with the new successor en-
terprise. In particular, shareholders may reason that managers and
acquirers know of a corporate secret or other indication of future
success and, therefore, that their firm is currently underpriced in
the market. 30 The shareholders' aim then becomes to continue in
the enterprise and not be frozen out. Shareholders thus wish to ride
their representatives' or acquirers' "coattails" to success. One
might therefore sympathetically hope that corporate law would give
to a shareholder, who owned one percent of a corporation valued at
$100x, one-half percent of the stock of an acquirer that was worth
$100x and now will be of size $200x, rather than giving the share-
holder cash only. 3' Of course if the acquiring corporation's stock is
widely traded, then shareholders who receive cash can simply
purchase some of the acquirer's stock, thereby finding alternate ac-
cess to the coattails.
Since this view has enjoyed some support among commenta-
tors32 and, in our experience, enjoys great support among novices, it
is perhaps quite plausible that shareholders and legislators would
have this goal in mind when fashioning an appraisal remedy. Pre-
sumably, appraisal's expense and potential to drain liquid assets
would encourage managers not to abandon shareholders but, in-
stead, to make plans that carried old shareholders on their coattails
to success.
The coattails view does have some explanatory power with re-
gard to appraisal statutes. It might, for example, explain the gen-
eral lack of availability of appraisal for shareholders of a
corporation that is acquiring another corporation's assets. It might
also explain why some statutes deny appraisal to shareholders when
charter amendments fundamentally change their corporations.
Nevertheless, we do not take the coattails goal very seriously in this
Article because in our view it does not necessarily advance share-
holder interests or any convincing fairness or efficiency goal. The
shareholder who is not shaken off but continues in the enterprise
30. The market is unlikely to take all nonpublic information into account. In the
extreme case, if a controlling manager knows of the rich discovery of a future profitable
contract and does not immediately trade on the basis of this knowledge, the market
surely will underprice the firm's stock. See generally Gilson & Kraakman, The Mecha-
nisms of Market Efficiency, 70 VA. L. REV. 549 (1984).
31. We believe that this viewpoint has an efficiency as well as a fairness aspect. The
former can be related to a concern regarding wasteful transactions and managerial ac-
tivity while the latter should be associated with Brudney and Chirelstein, Fair Shares in
Corporate Mergers and Takeovers, 88 HARV. L. REV. 297 (1974). This is hardly the
place to comment on the literature generated by Professors Brudney and Chirelstein; it
should suffice to say that although not all sharing questions have only one correct an-
swer, good arguments can be mounted against sharing patterns that are enormously
favorable to insiders or other controllers.
32. Id. at 323.
[Vol. 32:429
HeinOnline  -- 32 UCLA L. Rev. 436 1984-1985
THE APPRAISAL REMEDY
may simply be given too little in the way of ownership of the surviv-
ing corporation. Indeed, there is no reason to think that one who
gets cash for stock is on balance any worse off than one who re-
ceives an acquirer's stock in exchange for target stock. Imagine, for
example, that the original target corporation is valued in the mar-
ketplace at $100x. The target may have a terrific business opportu-
nity that its managers have kept secret for no good business reason.
They now hope to share the value of this opportunity with an ac-
quirer, also worth $100x-at the expense of the old target share-
holders. The new corporation may be worth not $200x but $300x,
for example, and a true arm's-length bargain might have yielded
$200x for the assets and secrets of the target; allowing the old share-
holders to stay on gives them $1.50 for every $2 in value that is
really theirs (since they owned pieces of a $200x corporation and
are now given half the stock of a $300x corporation). The ride on
the coattails may thus sometimes be better than a cash-out that
would, for example, give less than $1.50 for what was said to be $1
in value but what was really $2 in value.33 This is hardly the sort of
arrangement, however, that shareholders and legislators should
agree upon ex ante since it generates unnecessary and inefficient se-
cret keeping, unnecessary and costly mergers, and ultimately, high
costs in pooling equity.
The point is thus really a simple one. Allowing shareholders to
continue on in the corporate enterprise gives them a share of the
upside return but this share may still be less than the share or cash
that they would have received in an arm's-length bargain. Never-
theless, since this ride on the coattails seems attractive, conceivably
it motivates appraisal statutes' granting appraisal whenever share-
holders are threatened with abandonment.3 4
B. The Purpose of the Appraisal Remedy--Credible Goals
The goals advanced in this section share the ex ante perspective
of the group coordination and coattails views just described. These
goals, however, explain more than the group coordination view and
are more analytically sound than the coattails notion.
1. Inframarginality
Shareholders, or legislators acting on their behalf, may realize
33. This is surely the point Brudney and Chirelstein were making, id. An unfair
coattails ride may on balance be better than a cash-out.
34. This conjecture reflects the familiar but difficult intersection between positive
and normative theories. The former cannot be entirely separated from the latter. Posi-
tive theories are more convincing when they reflect our own normative views or norma-
tive views that we recognize as held by others. Here, the text disagrees in a normative
sense with the coattails view but suggests that it is a reasonable positive view precisely
because legislators and others easily might fall for its normative aspect.
1985]
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ex ante that they will not all "appreciate" their shares identically,
that the marginal, or market, price therefore understates their aver-
age valuation of these shares, and that appraisal may serve to pro-
tect these inframarginal valuations. To be sure, shares of one
company may be perfect substitutes for shares of another; in that
case all shareholders would value their shares equally, object less or
not at all to acquisition terms that gave each something equal to or
more than the marginal market price, and sometimes enjoy being
"frozen out" at some premium above market price. But it is plausi-
ble that some state statutes, or some shareholders, view sharehold-
ers' "demand" for a given enterprise's stock as not identical, while
others assume that to the contrary this demand is in economic
terms quite elastic, because shareholders do identically "appreciate"
their shares. The former presumably would grant appraisal more
than the latter. Note, furthermore, that as a matter of economic
efficiency an acquirer paying a premium above market price for all
the shares of a target may not necessarily put the target's resources
to better use. The acquirer reveals a higher valuation of the com-
pany only when it offers a price per share that is greater than the
average, rather than marginal, valuation of target shareholders. In
short, market prices are marginally determined and do not neces-
sarily reflect real inframarginal valuations.
35
Consider, for illustrative purposes, shares that sell on the mar-
ket for $10 but that shareholders on average value at $15. Some of
these investors have, of course, purchased additional shares at the
"bargain" marginal price, but eventually valued the last shares
purchased at $10 or so, perhaps because each additional purchase
decreased portfolio diversification. Even ex ante these shareholders
might have agreed upon an appraisal remedy through which, in the
event of a fundamental change such as a take-over, they could turn
in their shares and receive more than $10 for each one. Such a
remedy would compensate for inframarginal property values and
35. A firm's marginal, or market, price in the hands of Manager A may be $10 with
10 shares outstanding, but because of inframarginality, or inelasticity, its total value
may be $140. Manager B may pay $120 for the firm by paying $12 per share, and yet B
may be able to produce earnings that reflect only a price of $125 while A was able to
produce the greater value of $140. The inframarginality of investors' demand for shares
(or the owners' corresponding willingness to sell or supply shares) and the potential for
inefficient transactions are illustrated in both Carney, supra note 4, at 112-17, and
Levmore, Self-Assessed Valuation Systems for Tort and Other Law, 68 VA. L. REV. 771,
781 n.35, 849-52 (1982). Many sophisticated people cannot imagine that investors be-
lieve they can outguess the market and, therefore, insist on inframarginal value. It is
therefore probably worthwhile to note that many small investors do not buy market
funds, do spend substantial resources on market advice, and generally give no indication
that they consider most shares substitutes for shares of other enterprises. Legislators
are elected by these citizens and no doubt often are themselves just such investors. As
the citation above shows, we do not mean to suggest that no sophisticated person would
pursue the inframarginality goal.
[Vol. 32:429
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discourage take-overs at a price less than the sum of the values all
the individual shareholders put on their holdings. If a pure market
exception is in effect or if an appraisal statute should demand that
recent market prices-perhaps before news of a fundamental
change clouded the market-determine the appraised value of
shares, then the inframarginality goal is not served. Note also that
if appraisal is meant somehow to account for inframarginal values,
then appraisers are faced with a terribly difficult valuation problem,
because no objective evidence exists regarding an individual's sub-
jective valuation. Presumably, shareholders, legislators, and judges
simply could understand that an incantation which yielded an ap-
praised value somewhat greater, than the marginal market value
would do the job.36 Thus, although there is much to be said for
inframarginality concerns as an appraisal statute goal, it is admit-
tedly a goal that could be contracted for or legislated in only an
inexact way.
Although the discussion in Part II sorts out various statutes in
detail, it may be helpful to see the inframarginality goal applied.
Consider again the market exception in Delaware's statute. 37 The
shareholder of an acquired corporation generally is entitled to ap-
praisal when the acquisition calls for him to give up his stock and
receive stock, cash, or other consideration. But if the shareholder
gives up widely traded stock and receives the acquirer's stock or any
widely traded stock, then appraisal is not available. The link be-
tween marketability-that is, how widely traded shares are-and
inframarginality now provides the necessary analytic tool. The
more that a good has close substitutes in the market and the more
that a buyer can acquire and exchange these substitutes, the less
likely it is that an owner values such a good more than the (margi-
nal) market. This is not to say that an owner of Exxon shares could
not value his shares at a price higher than the prevailing market
price; but it is more likely that a shareholder of a small, untraded
enterprise values his shares differently from other investors in this
36. We hardly mean to contend that the notorious randomness that in practice has
been the nature of both the Delaware block method, see, e.g., Application of Del. Rac-
ing Assn., 213 A.2d 203 (Del. 1965) (illustrating application of Delaware block
method), and of other systems of "balancing" asset, market, and earnings figures, see W.
CARY & M. EISENBERG, supra note 1, at 129-36, directly reflects a passion for in-
framarginality. The point is that courts do seem to work hard to arrive at valuations
that exceed market prices, see cases collected in Schaefer, The Fallacy of Weighting
Asset Value and Earnings Value in the Appraisal of Corporate Stock, 55 S. CAL. L. REV.
1031 (1982), and that a belief or understanding that things no longer for sale are worth
more than their last price tags indicate may motivate these high appraisals. Indeed,
although the Delaware Supreme Court disowned the use of the block method in Wein-
berger v. UOP, Inc., 457 A.2d 701, 712-13, (Del. 1983), it did so in favor of allowing
more rather than less evidence as to values exceeding market prices.
37. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 262(b) (1983).
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little-known company. Indeed, it is quite unlikely that any two in-
vestors study an untraded enterprise enough to value it alike. Thus,
shareholders or legislators, ex ante38, might well agree on ap-
praisal-in pursuit of the inframarginality goal-when shareholders
must give up thinly traded shares, 39 since the shareholders probably
lose inframarginal value in such a transaction. Moreover, even
when shareholders give up widely traded shares for cash, they may
lose some inframarginal value because marketability only increases
the likelihood of, rather than guarantees, perfect elasticity. How-
ever, when shareholders give up widely traded shares and receive
other widely traded shares or thinly traded shares of the acquirer, it
may well be that no net loss of inframarginal value occurs; this is
because that which is received is also not valued identically by all
recipients so that inframarginal value may take the place of lost in-
framarginal value. Indeed, if shareholders' demand for the stock
received is more inelastic than for the stock given up, inframarginal
value may be increased. To be sure, the Delaware statute does not
appear to be of the inframarginality sort when it serves to reassert
the availability of appraisal in circumstances in which target share-
holders must give up widely traded shares in return for thinly
traded shares of a corporation other than the acquirer. 4° In these
circumstances, there would seem to be an increase, as it were, in
inframarginal value, and yet appraisal is available. Fortunately for
the purposes of this illustration, such circumstances may be rare
enough for the statute to have ignored them. It is hard to imagine a
widely traded and, therefore, relatively large company being ac-
quired in return for a large amount of consideration in the form of a
remote thinly traded company's stock. In any event, the in-
framarginality goal, described more fully in Part II as explaining
the Delaware appraisal statute, consists of the notion that appraisal
may serve to protect the "consumer surplus" or above-market valu-
ation of investors.
Note that the inframarginality goal is quite different from the
coattails theme described above. Most importantly they generate
dissimilar prescriptive implications. The coattails problem is one of
coming up with the proper exchange rate so that shareholders who
give up their stock receive a fair amount of stock in the surviving
38. The text adopts an ex ante, hypothetical bargaining view of legal rules. Like
the group coordination approach, discussed supra text accompanying note 26, it thus
considers some legal rules as off-the-rack rules that generate transaction cost savings.
In this particular example, the "bargain" may be created by the entrepreneurs who
begin a corporation (or by the legislators who formulate a state corporation statute that
is then taken off the rack by the founder).
39. By "thinly traded" we mean stock that is not widely traded under statutory
definition. Thus, stock for which there is no market at all is thinly traded.
40. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 262(b)(2) (1983).
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enterprise. A ride on the coattails of insufficient magnitude will not
do, but the correct exchange rate can be reached. If, for example,
the target's managers bargain selflessly and vigorously, they may
arrive at a deal that gives their shareholders a fair amount of the
acquirer's stock. On the other hand, inframarginality is much more
person-specific and therefore difficult to evaluate, even with the best
of managerial intentions. Managers (or the law) may know that all
investments are not perfect substitutes and that their firm's out-
standing shares contain inframarginal value, but there is little that
they can do to determine the magnitude of such value. Managers
can hardly poll the shareholders since shareholders want managers
to bargain as effectively as possible regardless of their shares' value
and since some shareholders may act strategically by holding out
beyond their share's real valuation.41 In the absence of a measure-
ment of inframarginal values, we can only agree ex ante on rules of
thumb for the protection of such value against deals that undersell
shares at market prices. These rules of thumb may then form the
contents of appraisal statutes.
2. Reckoning
Shareholders must monitor their corporations in order to eval-
uate their agents, or managers. Such monitoring may lead to dis-
placement of personnel, either directly or through a take-over, or to
some shareholders' selling out to new investors and committing the
proceeds elsewhere. For a variety of reasons, then, shareholders,
managers who will hope for promotions or lateral employment pos-
sibilities, and legislators can be expected to arrange ways in which
management's performance can be evaluated regularly. Generally
speaking, this evaluation involves measuring the income that man-
agement produces from the capital put at its disposal. But this
monitoring or measuring of performance-usually formalized at
calendar intervals--can be confused in fundamental ways when the
corporation undergoes major changes. Some managers may be
good at a particular kind of business, in an organization of limited
size, or when associated with other managers; but an acquisition or
other fundamental change may so change the entity as to obfuscate
the managers' various performances. The entity that emerges after
the change may be different enough from that managed before the
change that much information about managers will be lost if the
two experiences are evaluated as one. Appraisal at the time of the
change thus may serve as a point of "reckoning"; prior performance
is reckoned and future performance can be judged from the bench
41. For a discussion of a system design that overcomes such strategic behavior, see
Levmore, supra note 35, at 851-57 (self-assessment system for shares in freeze-out gen-
erates substantial transaction costs).
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mark determined at appraisal. Similarly, an important change in a
corporation's structure itself may be credited or blamed for changes
in profitability so that managerial performance before and after
such a change might best be judged separately. 42 In short, since
appraisal of some shares requires appraisal of the enterprise's value
as a whole, it may be sensible for monitoring purposes to allow for
or even to encourage appraisal, or reckoning, at important
junctures.
For illustration we again look to a link between a credible goal
of appraisal-here, reckoning-and the details of a statute's market
exception. Michigan's statute, like others, provides for appraisal of
a target corporation shareholder's stock when the target is acquired
for cash or another corporation's stock.43 Clearly, such an acquisi-
tion is an important event in the life of the target's managers and
provides an appropriate opportunity to reckon their performances.
The Michigan statute then proceeds to deny appraisal when the tar-
get shareholders give up widely traded stock, or give up thinly
traded stock and receive cash or widely traded stock.44 Note that
this statute does not pursue inframarginality since it does not re-
quire appraisal when the shareholders give up thinly traded stock
and thus probably lose inframarginal value. Now consider the
monitor seeking to measure managerial performance. It is possible
that the Michigan statute attempts to offer appraisal when reckon-
ing is particularly difficult, namely when two entities must be evalu-
ated at one time. If widely traded shares or cash are received, then
the target's performance before and after the acquisition can be
judged rather easily because the magnitude of the consideration is
apparent.45 And if thinly traded shares are received but the target
was itself widely traded so that widely traded shares are given up,
then the target's future performance can be separately measured
simply by following the stock market. Thus, if one believes that
marginal stock market prices are reliable indicators of a corpora-
tion's value-that is, if one does not believe that inframarginal val-
42. To be sure, managers will hope to take credit for improvements, but the point
in the text is that their supervisors, future employers, or investors may have good reason
to believe that the change in corporate structure itself deserves the credit. Thus, the
comment in the text does not offer appraisal as a solution to a familiar measurement
problem but rather argues that appraisal can generate what might be an important tool.
43. MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 450.1761(a) (West 1983).
44. Id. §§ 450.1761(a), 450.1762(1). This type of market exception was introduced
in 1972 over the reporter's objection. See MICHIGAN LAW REVISION COMMISSION,
FwrH ANNUAL REPORT SUPPLEMENT: BUSINESS CORPORATION ACT 219-20 (1970).
New Jersey followed Michigan's lead in 1973. See infra note 81.
45. The consideration received may reflect a mere guess about how these managers
will perform in the future-while the reckoning enterprise looks for a bench mark to
close up the past-but presumably this is the best we can do: Future bench marks also
will contain some sense of yet more futuristic expectations, but at least these bench
marks can be compared to one another.
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ues are different from marginal values for widely traded
corporations-but one fears that fundamental corporate changes
will confuse monitoring, then a Michigan-type appraisal statute is
fitting. Such a statute could be labelled a reckoning-plus-nonin-
framarginality statute to reflect that it elegantly achieves the reck-
oning goal only if marginal, or market, prices of widely traded
stocks are indicative of a corporation's value. A statute that sought
to achieve both the reckoning and inframarginality goals presuma-
bly would grant appraisal at the time of an acquisition and contain
no market exception or, if an active market is thought to provide
sufficient information for reckoning purposes, then such a statute
could offer a Delaware-style market exception.
46
3. Discovery
It would be reasonable to fashion an appraisal statute that
helps shareholders uncover and prevent truly wrongful behavior by
the managers they employ. Shareholders must worry that their
agents will usurp the best business opportunities that come along,
postpone profitable investments until a greater portion of the upside
return is secured away from passive shareholders, and otherwise
breach their fiduciary duties and contractual responsibilities. In
particular, mergers and other fundamental changes magnify the op-
portunities for managerial misbehavior. Managers at these times
should bargain for bigger stakes on behalf of all shareholders, but
they may be tempted to bargain less effectively when those across
the bargaining table promise large salaries, side payments, or other
inducements. Indeed, shareholders may fear most that the acquisi-
tion or change at issue is itself the product of managerial intrigue;
managers may have kept secret an important corporate opportunity
so that the market price is now unrealistically low, thus attracting a
curious or partly informed potential acquirer who is now interested
and ready to pay a "finder's fee" to the target's managers. In short,
shareholders, and the economy itself, can be terribly shortchanged
if major transactions 'are not negotiated at arm's length.
To be sure, fiduciary suits can compensate wronged sharehold-
46. See, e.g., VA. CODE §§ 13.1-75(a), (i)(2), 13.1-78(a) (1985); see also infra note
65.
It is only fair to note that a serious reckoning statute might mandate appraisal at
corporate expense, rather than simply offer it in the manner just described. Such a
statute would overcome the free rider problem among shareholders who might hope
that others will subsidize the reckoning enterprise-however inexpensive it is. See infra
text accompanying note 88. Note that unfortunately-from the perspective of the reck-
oning goal-a shareholder cannot normally dissent with a few of his shares (to promote
reckoning) while using his other shares in a different manner. This seeming blow to the
reckoning idea's explanatory power might be explained as necessary to prevent specula-
tive dissenters who, in the quest for occasional windfalls, will add unnecessarily to the
costs of transactions.
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ers and deter managerial or majority shareholder misbehavior. But
such litigation can be expensive, with procedural and substantive
hurdles to overcome. Potential plaintiffs do not necessarily know
what they are looking for or where to look; they know only that
there is potential for misbehavior. Nor will optimal private enforce-
ment be easily generated by the grant of generous recoveries and
attorneys fees to the successful whistle-blower. 47 The appraisal
remedy may, however, serve as a useful "discovery" tool for uncov-
ering suspiciously non-arm's-length bargains or side payments to
the target's managers, guiding future fiduciary suits, and, generally,
deterring misbehavior. Appraisal can serve this discovery goal ef-
fectively because it is relatively quick (especially because there is no
need to prove the presence of a wrongdoer), because it generally
calls for a sharing of costs between the parties 4 8 and because it can
bring out information about corporate assets and plans that is useful
to anyone considering a fiduciary suit. Of course, a good deal
hinges on the sort of information deemed relevant to appraisal; the
more the appraiser calls for information about research develop-
ments, apparently idle assets, and elements of compensation, the
more clues about strategic secrets and other misbehavior are likely
to emerge. Note also that appraisal itself will threaten to drain the
corporation's funds and therefore may deter misbehavior by manag-
ers whose plans require the presence of these funds. Again, share-
holders, managers, and legislators are likely ex ante to agree on
such a system because it may contribute to corporate performance
and help attract capital.49
A statute, such as the Model Business Corporation Act of
1978, 50 may provide for appraisal in virtually all circumstances in
which managers could receive payments or in which they could
continue to work for the surviving enterprise, or both. Such a stat-
ute may thus be explained as pursuing the discovery goal just de-
scribed.51 The details of the explanations just introduced and the
somewhat obvious implications of the discovery goal for decisions
about the "exclusivity" of appraisal 52 are taken up in the remaining
47. See Levmore, supra note 21, at 64-65 & n.71 (1982).
48. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 2620) (1983) (granting courts power to
allocate appraisal costs to dissenters); CAL. CORP. CODE § 1305(e) (West 1977) (grant-
ing courts power to allocate appraisal costs-including attorneys fees -entirely to the
corporation in certain specified circumstances); N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAW § 623(h)(7)
(McKinney Supp. 1984-85) (same); MODEL BUSINESS CORP. AcT § 81(i) (1978)
(same).
49. Of course the potential of appraisal to drain funds may provide a destructive
dissenter with a tool. Shareholders inclined ex ante to offer appraisal must hope that
legal and other costs will discourage exploitative "dissenters."
50. MODEL BUSINESS CORP. AcT (1978).
51. Id. § 80.
52. Exclusivity refers, among related things, to the question of whether a share-
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parts of this Article.
II. EXPLAINING CURRENT STATUTES
In this part we examine the variety of current state appraisal
statutes in light of the possible and sensible appraisal goals dis-
cussed above. The discussion concentrates on three major and rep-
resentative statutes that can be linked, respectively, to the
inframarginality, reckoning, and discovery goals introduced in Part
I. We demonstrate how each representative statute can be ex-
plained as codifying the suggested appraisal goal. A jurisdiction
conveniently can be viewed as deciding, first, whether to grant ap-
praisal at the time of a given event in the life of the corporation and
its shareholders and, second, if appraisal is offered, whether then to
withdraw appraisal if the corporation's stock is widely traded, if the
transaction is a relatively minor one for the corporation involved, if
the transaction calls for shareholders to receive cash, or if a given
percentage of the shareholders approve of the transaction at issue.53
Why and when these possibilities should lead to the withdrawal of
appraisal is one of the subjects discussed in this part.
As for the "events" which may stimulate the grant of ap-
praisal, a few introductory comments are appropriate. There are,
essentially, at least six such events: (1) a merger in which the cor-
poration governed by the statute is acquired; (2) a merger in which
the corporation acquires another corporation; (3) a sale of all or
nearly all of the corporation's assets; (4) a sale of the corporation's
assets followed by its liquidation so that shares are necessarily given
up or made worthless; (5) a purchase of assets or stock for stock so
that old shareholder ownership interests are diluted; and (6) a char-
ter amendment. Note that a shareholder may be forced to give up
his shares and, at best, be made part of a fundamentally different
enterprise in (1) and (4), and that in all these events a shareholder
may involuntarily find himself with a different ownership share of a
fundamentally different business than he wished. That appraisal is,
nevertheless, normally denied in (4) when the sale is for cash,54 for
example, simply restates the explanatory impotence of the conven-
holder entitled to appraisal should be able to bring a fiduciary suit as well. See infra
notes 129-30 and accompanying text.
53. The appraisal remedy also may be withdrawn if the corporation is insolvent or
if payments to dissenters would make it insolvent. See, e.g., MODEL BUSINESS CORP.
AcT § 6 (1969) (restricting repurchase of any shares in insolvency); DEL. CODE ANN.
tit. 8, § 160(a)(1) (1983). Such insolvency presents intriguing questions but in practice
is unimportant and, in any event, outside the scope of this Article. See Manning, supra
note 5, at 234-35 n.28.
54. See, e.g., MODEL BUSINESS CORP. ACT § 80(b) (1969); N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAW
§ 910(a)(l)(B) (McKinney Supp. 1983).
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tional view of the goal of appraisal."5
A. Inframarginality Statutes: Delaware
In Delaware, as elsewhere, "market exceptions" 56 constitute an
important part of the statutory framework. 7 It is therefore useful
to begin with a review of the link between inframarginality and
marketability. A statute could pursue a raw inframarginality goal,
offering appraisal whenever shares must be exchanged or whenever
an enterprise alters its course, on grounds that investors' tastes, po-
sitions, and alternatives are dissimilar. Indeed, it may be that all
goods that are no longer sold are best thought of as "inelastically
demanded." An appraisal statute which offers appraisal at virtually
all junctures 58 may be pursuing the inframarginality goal in such a
straightforward and wholesale fashion. On the other hand, rather
than provide for appraisal at every important juncture, a statute
might protect inframarginal value by identifying those situations in
which substantial inframarginal value is most likely to be at stake.
In particular, it is more likely that shares do not have close substi-
tutes and are fairly associated with inframarginal value when they
are not actively and widely traded. A statute that sought to protect
55. See supra notes 23-24 and accompanying text.
56. Appraisal may be unavailable under a "market exception" if shares are widely
traded. In that case, one can assume that the market price is close to the formal ap-
praisal price. See generally Fischel, supra note 13.
57. Market exceptions, which differ in their details as discussed in this Article, are
found in such important state codes as DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 262(b) (1983); CAL.
CORP. CODE § 1300(b)(1) (West 1977); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 1515L (Purdon Supp.
1983); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 14A:lI-l() (West Supp. 1983); VA. CODE §§ 13.1-75(i)(2),
13.1-78(i)(2) (1978); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 607.244(3)(b) (West 1977). See generally
Note, A Reconsideration of the Stock Market Exception to the Dissenting Shareholder's
Right of Appraisal, 74 MICH. L. REV. 1023 (1976). The oldest of these provisions was
introduced in 1967 in Delaware and was based on a report by Professor Folk who
clearly agreed with Manning's criticism of the appraisal remedy. See E. FOLK, supra
note 16. See generally Folk, De Facto Mergers in Delaware: Hariton v. Arco Elecs.,
Inc., 49 VA. L. REV. 1261 (1963).
Professor Manning describes the North Carolina statute, N.C. GEN. STAT. § 55-
119(b) (1982) (introduced in 1955), and the Connecticut statute, CONN. GEN. STAT.
ANN. § 33-373(e) (West 1960) (introduced in 1959), which grant the appraisal remedy
upon a liquidation in kind, as reflecting the idea that "[a]ppraisal should be considered
an economic substitute for the stock exchange and its use should be limited to situations
in which the exchange, or some kind of a reasonable market, is not available [as in
liquidation]." Manning, supra note 5, at 261. But actually such a "market substitu-
tion" idea is not very well reflected in the statutes of these two states; unlike the Dela-
ware statute, or the 1969 Model Act, neither the North Carolina nor the Connecticut
statute offers a market exception in other contexts. Moreover, the North Carolina and
Connecticut liquidation provisions can better be viewed as aimed at the reckoning or the
discovery goal, discussed infra in text accompanying notes 77-105.
58. Appraisal might not be offered when a sale of assets is followed by liquidation
for cash when, arguably, inframarginal value is at least not exploitatively appropriated
by insiders.
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inframarginality might therefore withhold appraisal when the
shares that are given up, in a merger for instance, are widely traded
(that is, traded on the great stock exchanges or owned by thousands
of shareholders). 59 Alternatively, as we argued earlier,6° a statute
might reflect the notion that all shares, whether widely traded or
not, can contain inframarginal value, but that thinly traded shares
have more such value so that appraisal should protect shareholders
when transactions call for a "net loss" of inframarginal value.
Delaware's statute appears to reflect this last sort of in-
framarginality goal in its treatment of dissenting target shareholders
who face a merger. Appraisal is available whenever shareholders
give up thinly traded stock. It is also available when shareholders
give up widely traded stock and receive cash.6' The first of these
settings obviously involves substantial inframarginal value; the sec-
ond deals with a "net loss" in the sense that even though the share-
holders involved may have relatively little inframarginal value,
because their stock is widely traded rather than thinly traded, they
are given in its stead cash which is associated with zero in-
framarginal value. When widely traded stock is both given up and
received, appraisal is not available. Arguably, this is because there
is no net loss of inframarginal value since the new stock is associ-
59. The 1969 revision of the Model Business Corporation Act adopted such a
straightforward market exception. See Scott, Changes in the Model Business Corpora-
tion Act, 24 Bus. LAW. 291 (1968).
The Committee concluded that the Model Act should recognize the
fact of life that in substantially every case other than related to control,
the owner of shares of a company listed on a national securities exchange
regards himself as an investor in those securities, rather than as a part
owner of the corporate enterprise. The investor's objective is not to pro-
mote the income of the corporation but to enhance his distributive share,
not to increase the corporate assets but to enhance the value of his securi-
ties. Since the measurement of these objectives is provided by the ex-
changes, where a free market is established . . . the Committee
concluded that for such securities the concept of dissent and appraisal no
longer was required.
Id. at 303. This type of market exception is explicable if the demand for widely traded
stocks is highly elastic. In such a situation, shareholders' inframarginal interests would
be protected by an efficient stock market.
This market exception was repealed entirely in 1978. MODEL BUSINESS CORP.
AcT § 80 (1978). The drafters explained the repeal by expressing doubt about the relia-
bility of market prices. See Changes in the Model Business Corporation Act Affecting
Dissenters' Rights, 32 Bus. LAW. 1855, 1862-63 (1977). The Model Act's evolution,
like that of other state statutes that do not offer market exceptions, is better viewed in
light of the discovery rather than the inframarginality goal.
60. See supra text accompanying notes 36-40.
61. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 262(b)(2) (1983). Kansas, Maine, and Virginia fol-
low the same pattern. KAN. STAT. ANN. § 17-6712(k) (1981); ME. REV. STAT. ANN.
tit. 13-A, § 908 (4), (5) (West 1981); VA. CODE § 13.1-75(i)(2) (1978). The Kansas
statute is also identical to Delaware's with respect to the events that trigger the ap-
praisal remedy. KAN. STAT. ANN. § 17-6712 (1981).
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ated with some consumer surplus.62 And when widely traded stock
is given up in return for thinly traded stock of the acquiring, or
surviving, corporation, there surely is no net loss in inframarginality
and appraisal is again, fittingly, unavailable. 63
Two minor transactions do not fit elegantly into the in-
framarginality theme. If shareholders give up thinly traded stock in
return for thinly traded stock, Delaware provides for appraisal,
although there is no net loss of inframarginality. And if sharehold-
ers receive thinly traded stock of a corporation other than the ac-
quirer in return for widely traded stock, appraisal is available even
though there may even be an increase in inframarginal value.64 The
first of these cases may reflect something like the coattails argument
described in Part I: Shareholders might be exploited in a transac-
tion which offers like currency-but not enough of it. Appraisal
may help shareholders judge the wisdom of the transaction even
though there is no net loss of inframarginality. In any event, there
is no issue here of net gain in inframarginality; therefore, the availa-
bility of appraisal in this situation is probably, at best, a minor ex-
ception to the Delaware statute's inframarginality theme, although
it might be described as fitting other credible goals. The second
exception-receipt of thinly traded stock of a corporation other
than the acquiring or surviving corporation-is less important still.
There may be a fair number of triangular mergers of the opposite
(inframarginality) type, in which a thinly traded subsidiary survives
with old shareholders then receiving shares in a more widely traded
parent. But for the old target's shareholders to receive less widely
traded stock of a subsidiary or of some wholly unrelated and un-
known company must be so rare that the statute can be expected
either to ignore it or to be suspicious enough to grant appraisal.
When a corporation sells its assets and in return receives an-
other corporation's stock or cash, and then either continues as a
holding company or liquidates, the Delaware statute does not pro-
vide for appraisal.65 Unarmed with the inframarginality goal, it is
62. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 262(b) (1983).
63. Id.
64. See id.
65. Cf. Hariton v. Arco Elecs., Inc., 41 Del. Ch. 74, 76, 188 A.2d 123, 125 (1963)
(refusing to create judicially an appraisal remedy).
Other jurisdictions in which an asset sale does not trigger the appraisal remedy are
Hawaii, HAWAII REV. STAT. § 416-33, 417-19 (1976), Kansas, KAN. STAT. ANN. § 17-
6801, 17-6712 (1981), Nevada, NEv. REV. STAT. § 78.565, 78.510 (1979), and the Dis-
trict of Columbia, D.C. CODE ANN. §§ 29-373, 29-374 (1981).
Like Delaware, Maine and Virginia offer market exceptions to the target's share-
holders in a merger but, unlike Delaware, they also offer the appraisal remedy when the
corporation sells its assets unless its shares are widely traded, ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit.
13-A, §§ 908(1), (4), 1005 (1964); VA. CODE §§ 13.1-75(i)(2), 13.1-78(a), (i)(2) (Supp.
1984). As will become obvious, see infra text preceding note 76, these statutes easily
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hard to understand why appraisal should be available-market ex-
ceptions aside-when shareholders have their enterprise essentially
taken from them and transformed through a merger but not avail-
able when their corporation sells its assets. In both cases there sur-
vives a "fundamentally different" enterprise. In both there are
grave coordination problems66 that are best solved by coordinating
the responses of the target shareholders; it appears puzzling for the
problems to be solved in one case, with appraisal guaranteeing mini-
mum bargaining results, and not in the other.
The inframarginality notion solves this puzzle and provides a
clear distinction between acquisitions by merger and by asset sale.
If a shareholder's objection in a stock acquisition is that he values at
least some of his shares above the prevailing market price-because
the price reflects marginal and not average valuations-then in a
total asset sale his objection disappears. After all, since the entire
corporation will be sold, there will be no extrapolation from margi-
nal information; the shareholder can expect that the total worth of
all the assets divided by the number of shares outstanding will yield
proceeds in liquid form if the corporation follows the asset sale with
a dissolution that exceed the late market price. There will surely, in
any event, be no exploitation of the shareholder's inframarginal
value. Alternatively, one might note that the shareholder retains
his inframarginal shares after the asset sale. To be sure, a share-
holder may fear that his agent, the firm's manager, will not bargain
well in selling off assets and will instead fashion his bargaining posi-
tion by using the market price as a bench mark. But this is a sepa-
rate problem of vigorous representation. A shareholder who
worried only about inframarginal value would still, ex ante, seek an
appraisal remedy when his stock was to be acquired and not when
all the assets of his corporation were to be sold.
Inframarginality describes still other aspects of the Delaware
statute. Appraisal is available neither when the corporation amends
its charter nor when it purchases all the assets of another corpora-
tion in return for some of its own shares. 67 Whatever makes some
shareholders value a corporation's shares uniquely (in-
framarginally), is not likely to disappear in the course of a charter
can be viewed as pursuing both reckoning and inframarginality goals since they protect
inframarginality but, when necessary, provide information useful for reckoning. As
promised, the discussion in the text limits itself to representative statutes, each of which
focuses on a single goal.
66. See supra text accompanying note 26.
67. Cf. Orzeck v. Englehart, 41 Del. Ch. 361, 365-67, 195 A.2d 375, 377-78 (1963)
(denying appraisal rights to shareholders whose corporation purchased controlling
shares of other corporations in return for its controlling stock). Since Orzeck involved
managers who can be said to have been reliable bargaining agents for the shareholders,
the case may stand for a representation principle. See infra text accompanying notes
91-94, 114.
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amendment or expansion by asset purchase. 68 The structure of an
inframarginality statute, in Delaware or elsewhere, also appropri-
ately denies appraisal in the context of a familiar tender offer, in
which shareholders voluntarily and individually exchange stock for
compensation offered by a bidder.69 Group coordination aside-
because that is, after all, not the goal of a pure inframarginality
statute-there is every reason to expect a bidder to consider the
possibility of rejection by a number of inframarginal shareholders
and to offer significantly more than the market price, thus satisfying
the inframarginal needs of those tendering shareholders. Thus, not
only is the inframarginality goal consistent with the denial of ap-
praisal in tender offers, but also it-like the notion of corporate
"secrets" discussed in Part 11170 but unlike the group coordination 71
and unadorned efficient market views of corporate law-explains
the prevalence in tender offers of substantial premiums above mar-
ket price. 72
What is not explained by the inframarginality-Delaware link is
the availability of appraisal to shareholders of a corporation that is
itself thinly traded and that acquires another in return for its own
shares. 73 We would have expected that since the inframarginal
character of existing shares is likely preserved, as in the case of a
68. Although some charter amendments surely affect inframarginality, the text
simply posits it unlikely that the charter amendment process exploits inframarginal
value.
69. A tender offer does not trigger the appraisal remedy in any jurisdiction. Note
that the reckoning and discovery goals easily explain the unavailability of appraisal in a
tender offer setting. As discussed in the text, the inframarginality goal is also consistent
with the unavailability of appraisal in the tender offer context if one views the premiums
normally available in tender offers as rough compensation for inframarginality losses.
Some state statutes provide for a "stock exchange"-and grant appraisal to dissent-
ers from such a transaction-when more than half of the shares of a corporation are
acquired by another corporation pursuant to a plan approved by the board of directors
and the shareholders as stipulated in the statute. See, e.g., MODEL BUSINESS CORP.
AcT §§ 72A, 80 (1978). This stock exchange differs from a tender offer in that the
requisite shareholder approval binds all target shareholders. In addition, viewed in
terms of our discussion of the discovery goal and the representational needs of investors,
infra text accompanying note 114, the board of directors appears to be a good represen-
tative of dispersed shareholders in the context of a stock exchange but might not be as
useful a representative in a tender offer.
70. See infra text accompanying notes 91-94.
71. See supra text accompanying note 26.
72. Much recent work has sought to demonstrate that bidders do not lose in these
transactions. See Jensen & Ruback, The Market For Corporate Controlb The Scientific
Evidence, 11 J. FIN. ECON. 5, 5 (1983) (target shareholders do extremely well and bid-
der shareholders do not lose); Asquith, Bruner, & Mullins, The Gains to Bidding Firms
From Merger, 11 J. FIN. ECON. 121, 138 (1983) (shareholders of bidding firms benefit
from mergers). But why do bidders not do even better and extract target shares with a
very small premium?
73. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 262(b)(1) (1983). There are three exceptions to
this availability of appraisal: when the company's shares are widely traded, when less
than 20% of its outstanding shares is used, and when a subsidiary is acquired in a short-
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purchase of assets, appraisal would not have been made available.
Put differently, while the inframarginality goal explains Delaware's
different treatment of a sale of assets and an acquisition by merger,
it does not explain the difference between a purchase of assets and
an acquisition of another entity through merger. Weak arguments
are possible; it may, for example, simply be very rare for an ac-
quirer's stock not to be widely traded so that, as expected, no ap-
praisal is available in a purchase or acquisition of another
corporation. We prefer, however, to acknowledge that Delaware's
statute is not entirely of the inframarginality type. This exception
can be explained, with a bit of conviction, as reflecting the discovery
goal, perhaps because acquiring corporations in mergers are some-
times really being acquired in a way that makes important the man-
agers' self-interest. In other words, appraisal statutes may well
reflect a variety of goals even while one goal alone makes them most
comprehensible. Our own purpose is not to insist on a single goal
but rather to explore the ability of these goals to explain appraisal
statutes and to inform corporate law.
The inframarginality notion is thus a remarkably useful tool
for predicting when appraisal is available under the Delaware stat-
ute. Still, one might wonder whether the inframarginality goal re-
ally could be achieved unless the appraiser were instructed or
allowed to give the dissenter some compensation that was above the
market, or reconstructed market, value. One hardly would expect
an appraisal statute to call for a measurement of dissenters' idiosyn-
cratic estimation of a corporation's future-but some power to give
more than marginal value would be reassuring. Superficially, sec-
tion 262(h) of the Delaware statute crushes rather than reassures by
stating that the appraiser shall "determine . . .fair value exclusive
of any element of the value arising from the accomplishment or ex-
pectation of the merger . . . . -74 We emphasize the penultimate
word of this phrase. The appraiser may consider value that arises
from the qualities of the target as a partner in other mergers, just
not in the one dissented from. Therefore, there is a statutory source
for an appraisal "premium" that could block efforts to exploit in-
framarginal holdings. 75
form merger. Generally speaking, all the statutes provide for appraisal in the context
referred to in the text. See supra note 14.
74. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 262(h) (1983).
75. We believe that this reading of the Delaware statute is consistent with the re-
cent Delaware case of Weinberger v. UOP, Inc., 457 A.2d 701, 713-14 (Del. 1983). The
court held that "fair value" could include damages to minority shareholders--as op-
posed to mere "speculative elements of value that may arise from the 'accomplishment
or expectation' of the merger," id. at 713, which are excluded from the section 262
appraisal. Note that our reading of the statute is also appropriate from the perspective
of the discovery goal, although the complete absence of any exclusions from fair value
1985]
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B. Reckoning Statutes: New Jersey
An uninteresting but plausible reckoning statute would grant
appraisal at every opportunity. It would do so in order to give
shareholders and other interested parties information about manag-
ers' performance whenever a shareholder was willing to part with
shares and incur the costs of pursuing the appraisal remedy. Of
course, a statute could serve both the reckoning and inframarginal-
ity goals by making appraisal readily available and, perhaps, by in-
structing appraisers to look at evidence other than market price. A
subtler appraisal statute, cognizant perhaps of appraisal's costs and
guessing that the parties would not agree ex ante to bear the burden
of appraisal at every juncture in the corporation's life, would grant
appraisal only when reckoning was particularly difficult without it.
Such a statute also might pursue the inframarginality goal. Alter-
natively, the statute might disregard inframarginality, assuming
that shareholders' demands for stock, as opposed to residential
homes, for example, are similar enough to be satisfied by substi-
tutes, causing average values of shares to approach their marginal
values. The New Jersey statute76 is representative of this last sort.
We call it a reckoning-plus-noninframarginality statute since it does
not appear to protect inframarginal value in the way that Dela-
ware's statute does. Since it is the reckoning goal that we seek to
develop here, the following discussion considers the reckoning as-
pect of New Jersey's statute, and puts aside the ways in which in-
framarginality might be protected while pursuing the reckoning
goal.
In New Jersey, the availability of appraisal in a transaction in-
volving a sale of assets followed by liquidation, unless cash or
widely traded shares are received, 77 contrasts with the complete un-
availability of appraisal when assets are sold under the Delaware
statute.78 This feature of the New Jersey statute is a perfect codifi-
cation of the reckoning goal unaccompanied by a concern for in-
framarginality; when cash or widely traded shares are received,
shareholders and other employers are easily able to evaluate man-
agement performance. Appraisal is thus unnecessary to reduce
reckoning costs. It is only when thinly traded shares are received in
such a transaction that an ex post reckoning requires appraisal of
these shares, which now constitute the corporation's only property.
When assets are sold but a liquidation does not follow, the
might have been more suitable. Indeed, the New York statute was amended in this
direction in 1982. See N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAW § 623(h)(4) (McKinney Supp. 1984-85).
76. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 14A:11-1 (West Supp. 1983).
77. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 14A:ll-l(1)(b)(ii) (West Supp. 1983). An identical provi-
sion is found in MiCH. CoMP. LAWS ANN. § 450.1761(b) (West 1973).
78. See supra note 65.
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New Jersey statute grants appraisal even when cash or widely
traded shares are received-unless the corporation's shares were
themselves widely traded. 79 This limitation on the withdrawal of
appraisal could be regarded as a partial departure from the sug-
gested reckoning goal because appraisal is offered even when cash-
which is perfect for reckoning purposes-is received by a thinly
traded corporation. But it may be that unlike a merger or asset sale
followed by liquidation, where all assets are clearly traded away,
some asset sales are not total. Those trying to reckon managerial
performance will be quite interested in the value of any patents,
licenses, or other assets remaining in the corporation after "substan-
tially all" its assets are sold. Thus, the withdrawal of appraisal only
when the marketplace provides information for reckoning may be
sensible.
We turn now to mergers and to the availability of appraisal to
shareholders of both the target and the acquirer. Recall that Dela-
ware imposed a type of market exception on both sides of mergers
and that this uniformity, especially when it serves to offer appraisal
to shareholders of the acquiring corporation, is not explicable in
terms of inframarginality.80 The New Jersey market exceptions are
structured as follows: Shareholders of a target can enjoy appraisal
unless the shares they give up are widely traded or they receive
either widely traded shares or cash.81 And shareholders of an ac-
quirer are refused appraisal in precisely the same situation as they
would be refused appraisal in Delaware; appraisal is unavailable
whenever their shares are widely traded, whenever the shares used
by their corporation to acquire another amount to no more than
twenty percent of the corporation's outstanding stock, and when-
ever the acquisition is of a subsidiary in a short-form merger.82 The
reckoning concept works well when related to these rules. If the
target's stock is widely traded, then, if inframarginality is not taken
seriously or not pursued, shareholders can measure their managers'
performance rather well and have no need for appraisal. Similarly,
even if they give up thinly traded stock but receive cash or widely
traded stock, shareholders can reckon simply by comparing the
consideration they receive with that invested or measured at some
time in the past. Either way it is relatively easy to assess value at
79. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 14A:11-1(1)(b) (West Supp. 1983); see also MICH. COMP.
LAWS ANN. § 450.1761(b) (West 1973).
80. See supra text accompanying note 73.
81. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 14A:1 1-1(1)(a)(i) (West Supp. 1983); see also MICH. COMP.
LAWS ANN. §§ 450.1761(a), 450.1762(1) (West 1973).
82. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 14A:11-1(1)(a)(ii) (West Supp. 1983); DEL. CODE ANN. tit.
8, § 262(b)(1) (1983). The Michigan statute appears to grant appraisal in the context of
a short-form merger. See MICH. CoMP. LAWS ANN. § 450.1762(3) (West 1973) (refer-
ring to § 450.1704 and not § 450.1713).
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the time of the merger. Only if thinly traded shares are given up
and other difficult-to-measure shares are received is appraisal neces-
sary to facilitate evaluation.
Much the same is true regarding the measurement of the ac-
quiring managers' performance. If the shares used to acquire the
target are widely traded, then there is a bench mark for measuring
earlier performance; the magnitude of the acquisition is clear
enough to measure future performance. If the acquirer's shares will
not be widely traded, then appraisal will be useful as a means of
separating preacquisition from postacquisition performance. Fi-
nally, if this acquisition is relatively small compared with the size of
the acquirer, then arguably this event no more signals a time for
reckoning than does any other. Moreover, changes in the acquirer's
performance are as likely to derive from sources other than this rel-
atively minor acquisition.
Two other facets of the New Jersey statute are of interest. If
an acquirer purchases a target corporation's assets using a substan-
tial amount of its own thinly traded stock, then appraisal is avail-
able to the acquirer's shareholders.8 3 Such an appraisal can be a
good reckoning tool because future corporate performance may de-
rive from the new assets, the new size of the corporation, or a
number of other factors. 84 If widely traded stock is used, share-
holders will have a good bench mark because they will be able to
reckon preacquisition performance and know what was paid for the
new assets. If cash is used then appraisal is not available, but the
shareholders at least will know what was paid for the target and
reckoning will be easier. The statute, however, also provides for
appraisal for the acquirer's shareholders if widely traded stock of
the target is purchased with thinly traded stock of the acquirer. 85
This is, of course, inconsistent with the reckoning goal as described
because the market value of the target's stock should provide the
necessary measurement tool. It is arguable that such a transaction
is rare because larger enterprises are generally more widely traded
than smaller ones.8 6 Nevertheless, it is an exception to the reckon-
ing theme worth noting.
Finally, New Jersey does not provide for appraisal in the event
of a charter amendment. A statute in pursuit of the reckoning goal
could go either way. To the extent that charter amendments effect
minor changes such as adding to the number of corporate officers,
83. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 14A:10-12 (West Supp. 1983). Michigan has no compara-
ble provision.
84. For example, the aquisition may have tax-related advantages or disadvantages.
85. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 14A:10-12 (West Supp. 1983).
86. It is also arguable that the statute simply recognizes a goal unrelated to reckon-
ing; managers may use thinly traded stock to disguise misbehavior. But the discussion
continues to treat each statute as aimed at but one goal.
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appraisal may be an unnecessary cost. A shareholder looking to
reckon managerial performance after a change in state of incorpora-
tion or addition of a new class of stock might, however, wish there
had been an appraisal at the time of the change. It is interesting
that Michigan's statute, which is virtually identical to New Jersey's
(except that it does not provide for appraisal when assets are
purchased) and therefore appears to be a reckoning statute, does
provide for appraisal at the time of a charter amendment.8 7 Appro-
priately enough, given that it too must be a reckoning-plus-nonin-
framarginality legislative package, the Michigan statute does not
provide appraisal in the context of a charter amendment if the cor-
poration's shares are widely traded. In that case, the effect of the
charter amendment, as opposed to other managerial decisions, pre-
sumably can be reckoned by following the stock market.
However successfully statutes can be described as pursuing the
reckoning goal, there is a free rider problem that can interfere with
this reckoning, or monitoring, system. Statutes, such as New
Jersey's, do not mandate appraisal when a bench mark would be
useful for reckoning purposes; they simply offer it to shareholders
who formally dissent from the transaction in progress. Those dis-
senters must pay for--or at least share in the cost of-appraisal if
they elect it.88 Many shareholders may wish that a measurement
were taken, but each may hope that someone else dissents and ex-
pends resources in appraisal. It may be that as an empirical matter
the statutes' disinclination to force appraisal is no obstacle to the
reckoning theme; there may always be at least one feisty or selfless
shareholder who does the job. In any event, the reckoning goal is
both sensible and, as a descriptive matter, almost perfectly codified
in some statutes. We do not make this statement to endorse such
statutes, but simply to note their character.
C. Discovery Statutes: New York
We will present a discovery statute in the next part that we
believe is more sophisticated and effective than any now in effect.
But first, it is useful to review the nature of the discovery goal and
the way it is apparently codified in a number of statutes. Again, we
choose one statute, in this case New York's,89 as representative.
What underlies the discovery goal is nothing less than the most
87. MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. §§ 450.1761, 450.1621 (West 1973).
88. There is no uniform rule for the assignment of expenses but it is fair to genera-
lize that the appraiser's fee usually is divided among the parties and that the parties'
legal costs rarely are borne by the opposing side. See H. HENN & S. ALEXANDER,
supra note 1, at 1008 n.23; In re Janssen Dairy Corp., 2 N.J. Super. 580, 589, 64 A.2d
652, 656-57 (1949) (assigning part of the appraiser's fees to dissenters). In any event, at
least some costs fall on active dissenters and can lead to free rider problems.
89. N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAW § 910(a)(1) (McKinney Supp. 1984-85).
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fundamental problem in corporate law, namely that managers may
not act in the interests of shareholders. Moreover, while managers
as insiders are equipped with information about the firm and the
opportunities that come its way, shareholders and other monitors
often have little information with which to challenge their agents.
Shareholders also have coordination problems in assembling infor-
mation and mounting such challenges. 90 In the context of funda-
mental corporate changes, which often trigger the appraisal
remedy, we think it useful and illuminating to focus on an aspect of
this agency problem that largely has been overlooked in the cases
and literature. We call this inside information "secrets": Managers
may know of corporate opportunities or have plans already devel-
oped that lead them to think that the value of the corporation is
greater than the value assigned by passive shareholders and other
outsiders. 9' The typical corporation surely must have many secrets;
some indicate a rosy future and others warn of losses. But for ex-
positive purposes we focus on those secrets that contain good news
for the corporation. Managers may keep secrets for selfless rea-
sons-most often revealing the secrets would destroy their value.
On the other hand, more self-interested managers may keep secrets
or even create them because they want to sell them to outsiders in
return for attractive employment contracts or other consideration.
Either way, outside shareholders cannot value their holdings accu-
rately. Even if their shares are actively traded these shareholders
will not be well informed, because the market is also ignorant-
except to the extent that insider trading has increased the market
price.92
Of course, shareholders of such secretive corporations are not
always in dire straits. While they may be relatively ignorant when
they sell their shares, sometimes the secrets kept from them will
conceal bad news and the sales will be fortunate. Most importantly,
shareholders often can rely on their representatives, or managers,
because these agents will bargain with outsiders at arm's length or
not at all and will not be tempted to undersell the secrets by offers
of side payments. The idea of corporate secrets explains, even bet-
ter than does the inframarginality concept, why substantial premi-
90. See Anderson, Conflicts of Interest: Efficiency, Fairness and Corporate Struc-
ture, 25 UCLA L. REV. 738, 779 (1978); Levmore, supra note 21, at 60 (1982) (free
rider problem among shareholders). See generally Jensen & Meckling, Theory of the
Firm: Managerial Behavior, Agency Costs and Ownership Structure, 3 J. FIN. ECON. 305
(1976).
91. Although such a scenario is familiar in insider trading cases, generally it is
neglected by commentators thinking about mergers and other fundamental changes. A
striking exception in the narrow context of "freeze-outs" is Vorenberg, Exclusiveness of
the Dissenting Stockholder's Appraisal Right, 77 HARV. L. REV. 1189, 1202-03 (1964).
92. See generally Levmore, Securities and Secrets: Insider Trading and the Law of
Contracts, 68 VA. L. REV. 117 (1982).
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ums above market price are paid in corporate takeovers.93 The
critical question for passive investors is thus whether or not their
managers are reliable bargainers. Managers' "defensive tactics" are
another aspect of this problem; managers may ward off seemingly
attractive take-over offers because they are guarding secrets that in-
dicate that the offers essentially undervalue the firm or because they
enjoy their positions and selfishly wish to continue in control. 94
The law, or, ex ante, coordinated shareholders and managers
themselves, 95 might take three approaches to this problem: (1) Of-
fer appraisal at important junctures, when there is a special danger
that managers are unreliable bargaining agents, and hope that it will
unearth information about unreliable bargaining agents or about
secrets themselves. While the law probably should not aim to dis-
cover and reveal the secrets these agents may harbor, because often
the revelation will injure all shareholders and ultimately the econ-
omy as a whole, it may hope through threat of appraisal to force
from management and the acquirer a large enough premium over
market price to dissuade potential dissenters and discourage ineffi-
cient transactions and to roughly compensate shareholders for the
secrets that are theirs. It seems sensible for shareholders to bring a
fiduciary suit against self-interested managers if appraisal unearths
information that supports such a claim;96 (2) Offer appraisal when-
ever managers are known to have conflicts of interest and be unreli-
able bargaining agents, and hope that the appraiser will find enough
clues about corporate opportunities, untapped assets, and other
secrets to compensate shareholders. More importantly, the burden,
drain, and publicity of appraisal will discourage managers and ac-
quirers from engaging in transactions that destroy the agency rela-
tionships crucial to the corporate structure; (3) Appoint a
nonmanagement bargaining agent on the shareholders' behalf and
93. See Jarrel & Bradley, The Economic Effects of Federal and State Regulations of
Cash Tender Offers, 23 J. L. & ECON. 371, 373 (1980) (finding that take-over premiums
average in excess of 50%); supra note 72.
94. The literature on defensive tactics focuses on the importance of information-
but only on information the target may have that is useful in assessing synergistic gains.
Although the possible role of "secrets" is neglected, the literature is provocative. See
Bebchuk, The Case for Facilitating Competing Tender Offers: A Reply and Extension,
35 STAN. L. REV. 23 (1982); Easterbrook & Fischel, Auctions and Sunk Costs in Tender
Offers, 35 STAN. L. REV. 1 (1982); Gilson, A Structural Approach to Corporations: The
Case Against Defensive Tactics in Tender Offers, 33 STAN. L. REV. 819 (1981); Gilson,
Seeking Competitive Bids Versus Pure Passivity in Tender Offer Defense, 35 STAN. L.
REV. 51 (1982). Of course, the acquirer may have developed a secret about the target or
its potential for synergistic gains. The evaluation of this possibility, critical to any anal-
ysis of defensive tactics and "fair sharing" rules, is beyond the scope of this Article.
95. See supra note 38. For the leading application of the idea that it is in managers'
interests to set up rules that shareholders will like, see generally Jensen & Meckling,
supra note 90.
96. See infra notes 129-30.
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encourage managers with carrots, sticks, or moral suasion to con-
fide in such an "independent representative." If such a representa-
tive were privy to secrets and could advise shareholders about the
desirability of proposed fundamental changes, then the agency
problem would be solved, albeit at a cost.97 This last option is espe-
cially attractive if managers inevitably face conflicts of interest de-
spite their role as bargaining agents for shareholders. This may well
be the case if it is efficient for the acquirer to offer to continue the
old managers in their positions in the enterprise because of their
experience with the acquired assets and personnel.
Approach (3) may well be the wave of the future and an experi-
ment worth trying,98 but it is not useful in describing any current
American statute and since we have no way of judging its costs, it is
pointless to sing its praises. Approach (2) is the tack which we take
in Part III; managers are given a powerful incentive to disclose their
conflicts of interest. Arguably, approach (1) is the one followed in
many statutes, including New York's.
Before turning to a particular discovery statute, it is useful to
consider the link between the discovery goal, in approach (1) form,
and marketability. If one distinguishes the breakdown of reliable
bargaining occasioned by agents' conflicts of interest (or even their
97. Of course, there are problems with this agent's incentives and behavior. See
generally Levmore, supra note 21. Nevertheless, this approach may be better than the
alternatives.
98. Approach (3) is found in other legal systems in the form of auditors or inspec-
tors. In France, the terms of a merger or consolidation must be examined in advance by
the auditors of each constituent corporation. In addition, the acquirer in a merger must
apply to the court for the appointment of an independent inspector to examine the
assets of the target. These experts submit their reports for the shareholders' considera-
tion when they vote at the shareholders' meeting. FRENCH COMMERCIAL COMPANY
LAW (Loi n" §§ 66-537 du 24 juillet 1966 sur les soci6t~s commerciales) §§ 377, 378.
See J. LE GALL, FRENCH COMPANY LAW 242-44 (1974). This idea was taken up by
the EEC company law harmonization program; its Third Directive in 1978 provided
that the terms of a merger or consolidation must be examined in advance by an in-
dependent inspector whose written report must, among other things, evaluate whether
the share exchange ratio is fair and reasonable. See Barbaso, The Harmonisation of
Company Law with Regard to Mergers and Divisions, 1984 J. Bus. L. 176, 181. In 1982,
West Germany introduced the above-mentioned directive to its company law and thus
adopted the mandatory inspector system. See AKTIENGESETZ [AKTG] § 340b
(Deutsche Gesetze 1983).
Japanese law does not have such a mandatory inspection system and only offers
two "general" audit mechanisms (as France and West Germany do in addition to the
mandatory inspector system just described). In Japan, a corporation must have audi-
tors independent from management, and minority shareholders may apply to the court
for the appointment of a special independent inspector when necessary. See Japanese
Commercial Code (SH6HO) §§ 273-280, 294 (1899 as amended). Among these coun-
tries, only Japan also offers a separate appraisal remedy. See Japanese Commercial
Code (SH6H1) §§ 245-2 (sale or purchase of assets), 408-3 (merger or consolidation)
(1899 as amended). Compared to the Japanese system, the appraisal remedy found in
state statutes in the U.S. may be assigned more "tasks" for discovery if aimed at such a
goal.
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hopes of employment) at the time of acquisition, from the presence
and problem of secrets, then one would offer appraisal at crucial
times but might withdraw appraisal when the company involved
was widely traded because the market could police fiduciary misbe-
havior. Inframarginality and secrets aside, obviously there is more
opportunity for misbehaving managers to undersell their corpora-
tion when there is no market check on the performance and value of
the enterprise. Indeed, California and Pennsylvania appear to have
just such appraisal statutes although they rely on the stock market's
reporting, or discovering, to different degrees.99 One may regard
secrets as central to these agency problems, so that the concern is
with the possible absence of reliable bargaining agents and the pos-
sible presence of corporate secrets known only to these agents, or to
these agents and interested acquirers who will compensate the
"agents" handsomely. If one holds this view, then marketability is
99. California provides unique rules. First, an acquiring corporation, or its parent,
owning more than 50%, but less than 90%, of the voting stock of the target corporation
that wishes to merge in a non-short-form merger, must obtain the unanimous consent of
the target's shareholders if the consideration offered in the merger is anything but non-
redeemable common stock of the acquirer or its parent. The Commissioner of Corpora-
tions, however, can approve a merger not meeting this requirement after reviewing the
terms, conditions, and fairness of the transaction. CAL. CORP. CODE §§ 1101, 1101.1
(West Supp. 1983).
Second, the appraisal remedy is available to target shareholders in a short-form
merger and to all shareholders in other mergers, asset sales, and stock exchanges, other
than shareholders of the acquirer or its parent, if after the transaction they would in
combination own at least five-sixths of the voting stock. Finally, appraisal is withdrawn
if the dissenter's stock is widely traded unless transferability of shares is restricted or
5% or more of the shareholders of any class dissent. Id. § 1300.
This complex statute can be viewed as strongly oriented toward the discovery goal.
The potential for managerial misbehavior must be thought to be relatively great in a
cash-out merger unless there is an arm's-length bargain-as when the acquirer or its
parent does not possess more than 50% of the voting power-or unless there is reason
for shareholders to be pleased rather than worried about the controlling power of their
fiduciaries--as when the shareholder has an interest in the acquirer in a short-form
merger (and appraisal is not available). And, as discussed in the text, when the stock is
widely traded, managerial misbehavior may be discoverable through market signals so
that the added expense of appraisal as a discovery tool is less worthwhile.
In Pennsylvania, a merger, consolidation, sale or purchase of assets, and certain
charter amendments all trigger the appraisal remedy except for shareholders whose
stocks are widely traded. The shareholders of the target in a merger do, however, have
the appraisal remedy available if they receive, in exchange for their widely traded
stocks, anything other than stock of any corporation. This discovery statute relies more
on the public stock market as a discovery tool than does California's. And while it does
not essentially ban cash-out mergers (or other mergers in which the target's sharehold-
ers receive anything other than stock) by requiring California-style unanimity, it obvi-
ously considers such mergers suspect and grants the appraisal remedy as a discovery
tool even if the target's shareholders surrender widely traded stock. PA. STAT. ANN.
tit. 15, § 1515 (Purdon Supp. 1983).
Note, finally, that by lifting its "ban" on those cash-out mergers approved by the
Commissioner of Corporations, California took a step in the direction of an "independ-
ent representative." See supra note 98 and accompanying text.
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hardly relevant since the market is unaware of these secrets and
therefore offers little help.
We turn now to the New York statute, which represents those
seeking to discover managerial misbehavior and protect shareholder
rights (while ultimately seeking to prevent misbehavior and ineffi-
cient transactions) when there is reason to worry both that manag-
ers are not serving shareholders well as bargaining agents and that
managers have secrets about future opportunities or hidden values.
The link between the New York statute and the discovery-and-
secrets theme is straightforward. We should expect appraisal to be
available in all important transactions except those in which manag-
ers representing the dissenting shareholders' interests already were
on both sides of the bargaining table or when it is very unlikely that
managers would be unreliable. The first of these exceptions is easy
to identify. When a parent corporation merges with its mostly
owned subsidiary in a short-form merger, appraisal is not available
to the parent's shareholders under the New York statute.l°° If there
are secrets at stake, the parent's managers know them so that the
denial of appraisal is consistent with the discovery-and-secrets
theme.
The second exception, covering situations in which it is un-
likely that managers will be unreliable or will switch allegiances, is
more difficult to identify than the first exception of dual allegiances,
or is simply vague. The New York statute offers appraisal to a tar-
get's shareholders when the target's assets are sold but withdraws
appraisal in circumstances in which there is a sale of assets for cash
followed by a liquidation of the target corporation. 101 It is possible
that such a transaction is less prone to managerial exploitation since
it involves dispersing the target's assets and terminating the employ-
ment of the target's management. The transaction would be more
prone to managerial exploitation if the managers continued in the
surviving enterprise, which might create doubts about their reliabil-
ity as bargaining agents for the target against the acquirer. Even if
this correlation between the firm's liquidation and its managers' re-
tirement is not strong, the remainder of the New York statute is
easily linked with the discovery goal. Appraisal is available, with no
market exceptions, to the target's shareholders in a merger102 as well
as in a sale of assets other than a sale for cash followed by liquida-
tion.10 3 It is also available to the acquirer's shareholders in a non-
100. N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAW § 910(a)(1)(A)(i) (McKinney 1963). Many states have
a similar provision, see also MODEL BUSINESS CORP. AcT §§ 80(c), 75 (1981).
101. N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAW § 910(a)(1)(B) (McKinney Supp. 1983); see also
MODEL BUSINESS CORP. AcT § 80(a)(2) (1981).
102. N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAW § 910(a)(1)(A) (McKinney 1963).
103. N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAW § 910(a)(1)(B) (McKinney Supp. 1984).
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short-form merger' ° 4 that adversely affects their rights, and to the
shareholders of a corporation that undergoes a charter amendment
seriously affecting shareholder rights. 10 5
104. Id. §§ 910(a)(1)(A), 806(b)(6). Issuing many new shares as consideration for a
merger would, in most cases, fall within the ambit of § 806(b)(6)(D) and therefore trig-
ger appraisal, since such issuance in most cases would necessitate raising the authorized
shares. If the acquirer already has a large number of authorized shares or uses treasury
shares to accomplish a merger, then, to be sure, appraisal is unavailable at the time of
the merger. Still, it was available when these shares were authorized-and the discov-
ery goal is as least partially fulfilled at that time.
105. Id. §§ 910(a)(l)(A)(ii), 806(b)(6). Under a discovery statute, the issue arises
whether there should be any difference between a merger (or consolidation) and a sale
of assets. One could argue that the need for discovery is equally strong in both situa-
tions. On the other hand, it is arguable that there is more reason to fear agent misbe-
havior in a merger than in a sale of assets because the latter often involves dispersing the
target's assets and therefore it may be correlated with terminating the target managers'
employment. It is certainly not surprising that statutes that we would regard as discov-
ery oriented all offer appraisal for mergers and then are mixed in their provision of
appraisal for a sale of assets. Compare, e.g., N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAW § 910(a)(1)(B) (Mc-
Kinney Supp. 1984) (shareholder has right to appraisal at sale, lease, or exchange of
corporation's assets) with D.C. CODE ANN. §§ 29-373, 29-374 (1981) (shareholder has
no right to appraisal at sale, lease, exchange, or mortgage of corporation's assets).
Similarly, a statute that granted appraisal in a merger only when the target's stock
was thinly traded stock, might or might not grant appraisal for thinly traded stock
when a sale of assets is concerned. The discovery goal argues for appraisal unless merg-
ers are more likely to be free of conflicts of interest than are asset sales. But the in-
framarginality goal argues mildly against appraisal in asset sales since there is no
exploitation of inframarginality and the bargain should be for total value. See supra text
accompanying notes 65-67. The 1969 Model Business Corporation Act in fact does
offer appraisal and the various state statutes go either way. Compare, e.g., MODEL Bus.
CORP. AcT § 80 (1969) and FLA. STAT. ANN. § 607.244(l)(b) (West Supp. 1984) with
NEv. REV. STAT. §§ 78.505, 78.521, 78.565 (1979).
Note also that unlike Delaware, some states grant appraisal on a sale of assets.
Some states also grant appraisal on a purchase of assets or stock through the judicially
created "de facto merger doctrine" rather than through statutory developments. See,
e.g., Farris v. Glen Alden Corp., 393 Pa. 427, 438, 143 A.2d 25, 31 (1958) (assets
purchase); Rath v. Rath Packing Co., 257 Iowa 1277, 1285-86, 136 N.W.2d 410,
414-15 (1965) (same). Some of these creations are codified. See, eg., PA. STAT. ANN.
tit. 15, § 131 IF (Purdon Supp. 1984-85) ("[tlhe shareholders of a . . . corporation
which acquires. . . all or substantially all of the property of another corporation...
shall be entitled to the [appraisal rights]. . . if, but only if, such acquisition shall have
been accomplished by the issuance of voting shares of such corporation to be outstand-
ing immediately after the acquisition sufficient to elect a majority of the directors of the
corporation") (response to Farris); OHIo REV. CODE ANN. § 1701.83 (Baldwin 1979)
(an assets or stock purchase triggers the appraisal remedy if made for stock that, after
the transaction, would result in more than one-sixth of the voting power). Such a trend,
if viewed from the perspective of the discovery goal, is not at all puzzling; appraisal
could be useful as a tool for reporting managerial misbehavior, not only to target share-
holders who will need to litigate, but also to shareholders of the surviving corporation in
a merger and to those of a purchasing corporation. Nevertheless, the de facto merger
doctrine may, like other corporate law doctrines, have less to do with a general goal of
corporate law and more to do with the integrity of the agency relationship in a given
case. See supra notes 91-94; infra note 114 and accompanying text.
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SUMMARY
A significant number of appraisal statutes can be described as
pursuing the inframarginality, reckoning, or discovery goals. Occa-
sional imperfections in these pursuits invariably can be blamed on
attempts to pursue more than one goal using only a single tool: Ap-
praisal is, after all, but one method of accomplishing the various
goals. Our aim in this part has not been the descriptive perfection
of the goals we identify. We simply have tried to show, first, that
the inframarginality, reckoning, and discovery goals are plausible
and defensible aims of corporate law and, second, that these goals
provide a framework for understanding and categorizing many ap-
praisal statutes that previously appeared chaotic. Appraisal statutes
are more ambitious than chaotic, reflecting as they do the many
concerns of corporate law.There are two loose ends in this discussion of the existing stat-
utes: the imposition of voting requirements on the occasion of most
fundamental corporate changes and the voluntary insertion of "ex-
tra" appraisal remedies by some corporations."' 6 Voting require-
ments do not shadow appraisal. Charter amendments require
shareholder voting approval' 07 but as we have seen, they do not
always trigger a right to appraisal; and statutes nearly always re-
quire voting for merger, asset sales, and so forth.'08 In addition,
while there are short-form merger exceptions to voting require-
ments,' °9 there are no market exceptions. In our view, shareholder
votes are probably a vestigial tool, albeit an expensive one at times.
While voting may evolve into a useful tool for eliciting preferences
(or even for determining inframarginality) and encouraging
monitors, it appears now to be offered only as a matter of course. It
is possible that two factors will together speed the evolution of this
potential tool: important literature on separating voting rights from
ownership 110 and on judicial inquiries into the will of the "majority
of the minority,"" 1 or the votes of outside shareholders. 112 At pres-
106. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 262(c) (1983); MODEL BUSINESS CORP.
ACT § 80(a)(5) (1982).
107. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 242(b) (1983); N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAW § 803
(McKinney 1984).
108. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, §§ 251(c), 271 (1983); N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAW
§§ 903, 909 (McKinney 1984).
109. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 253 (1983); N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAW § 905
(McKinney 1984).
110. See Clark, Vote Buying and Corporate Law, 29 CASE W. REs. 776 (1979);
Manne, Some Theoretical Aspects of Share Voting, 64 COLUM. L. REV. 1427 (1964);
Ratner, The Government of Business Corporations: Critical Reflections on the Rule of
"One Share, One Vote," 56 CORNELL L. REV. 1 (1970). See generally Easterbrook &
Fischel, Voting in Corporate Law, 26 J. L. & ECON. 395 (1983).
111. See, e.g., Weinberger v. UOP, Inc., 457 A.2d 701, 703 (Del. 1983).
112. Schulwolf v. Cerro Corp., 86 Misc. 2d 292, 297, 380 N.Y.S.2d 957, 962 (1976).
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ent we find the details of voting not noteworthy and not attached to
appraisal in any significant way.
As for the voluntary, corporation-specific expansion of ap-
praisal, none of the suggested goals leads one to object to additional
triggers of the remedy. Indeed, a state's statute may pursue one or
two goals and a particular group of shareholders associated with
some corporation may then wish to pursue an additional goal by
way of increased opportunities for appraisal. For example, a corpo-
ration that offers appraisal when charter amendments are passed
simply may be assuring that careful reckoning will be possible in the
future. The possibility that such charter-tailoring is, instead, mostly
a defensive tactic to ward off acquirers is beyond the scope of this
Article.113
III. TOWARD A CONSISTENT AND EFFECTIVE APPRAISAL
REMEDY: A DISCOVERY STATUTE
It is difficult if not impossible for a single tool, appraisal, to
serve effectively the variety of goals described in Part I. Although
the discussion in Part II displays the significant descriptive power of
some of these goals, it is hardly surprising that no goal enables us to
explain perfectly even a single appraisal statute. At best, as ap-
praisal remedies have evolved they have contained and balanced a
few goals at once. But this evolution-influenced, no doubt, by
strong criticism about appraisal's inability to meet what was con-
ventionally seen as its goal and by a sense that the remedy could not
play an important role in corporate law-often has been toward
limiting the availability of appraisal. With this as background, our
goal in this part has two components. First, it may be useful to
show that an appraisal statute can straightforwardly and consist-
ently pursue a single objective. There may be no particular reason
to wish for such consistency in a statute, but a quest for consistency
in light of alternative goals and the ways in which they can be codi-
fied may better inform and clarify legislative choices.
Second, as a normative judgment, we regard as crucial the
managers' roles as objective representatives, or agents, of sharehold-
ers. We therefore suggest that the discovery goal is worth pursuing.
Corporate law doctrines make good sense if one focuses on the
shareholders' need for reliable agents, the problems posed by con-
flicts .of interest in this agency relationship, and the role of law in
facilitating this relationship by intervening when conflicts are ap-
parent.1 14 Thus, when a corporation sells one widget to a buyer,
113. See supra note 94.
114. For a good discussion reflecting this view, see W. KLEIN, BUSINESS ORGANI-
ZATION AND FINANCE 112-21 (1980).
Arguably, the decided cases reflect our stress on good representation and the dis-
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corporate law will dismiss a dissenting shareholder's objection that
the price received for the widget was inadequate and not in the
shareholders' best interests. In this context there is every reason to
think that the corporation's management has fairly represented the
shareholders; moreover, courts are unlikely to be very good at sec-
ond-guessing pricing decisions. To be sure, since managers do not
earn all the profits from each sale, there is an everyday conflict of
interest that can lead to shirking. Presumably, however, sharehold-
ers are aware of this problem and can monitor performance and
structure incentives to combat shirking.
Consider, though, a larger transaction such as a stock-for-stock
merger or a sale of assets to an acquiring corporation. So much is at
stake here that shareholders might well be concerned about un-
known-conflicts of interest. If the target's managers do not have an
interest in the acquirer's success, then shareholders normally can
rely on the representation and bargaining ability of their managers.
But if, because of conflicts of interest, the managers are neither reli-
able bargaining agents nor reliable advisors regarding an acquirer's
offer, then shareholders must have two concerns: More is at stake
than in the everyday sale of a widget, and, as noted earlier, selfish
managers may have been unnecessarily silent about corporate op-
portunities or assets and may use an acquirer to exploit this
secret. 1
15
covery goal. For example, the "de facto merger" doctrine concerns the question of
whether remedies available in a merger should be granted judicially in a sale of assets on
the grounds that the merger often can be structured as the sale. It is, for instance,
rather simple to "sell" assets for stock of the acquirer so that the transaction is com-
pleted with results indistinguishable from that of a standard merger. Delaware and
Pennsylvania are divided on the matter. Compare the two famous cases of Hariton v.
Arco Elecs., Inc., 41 Del. Ch. 74, 76, 188 A.2d 123, 125 (1963) (finding asset sale within
DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 271, and therefore that remedies available in mergers were
not transferable to asset sales) and Farris v. Glen Alden Corp., 393 Pa. 427, 438, 143
A.2d 25, 131 (1958) (asset sale accomplished what a merger would have, so "de facto
merger" doctrine applied). But there is more to these cases. In Arco there is no evi-
dence of conflicts of interest and every reason to think that the target's shareholders,
including the plaintiff, were as well represented by their managers and directors as they
had been in routine business transactions. On the other hand, in Glen Alden the direc-
tors of the two combining corporations were closely intertwined and thus potentially
unreliable as bargaining agents; they were commingled, as it were, while bargaining was
in progress. (We are indebted to Marvin Chirelstein for this point.) Some directors
were sitting on the board of the other corporation and perhaps looking for jobs. The
grant of appraisal is, therefore, strikingly appropriate from the perspective of the discov-
ery goal, the goal we have, after all, "assigned" to Pennsylvania. See supra note 99. But
the real point is not so much to link the Glen Alden decision with the discovery goal as
to note that the divergence of the two cases may be based on factual differences rather
than on judicial attitudes; in Arco there were reliable bargaining agents and therefore
there was less reason to protect shareholders. In short, an unstated judicial sensitivity
for unrepresented shareholders, as reflected in Glen Alden, makes the discovery goal we
pursue in the text seem familiar rather than unattainable.
115. One can imagine that it is easier for a selfish manager to provide selective infor-
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We suggest, therefore, that an appraisal remedy be fashioned to
pursue the discovery goal as follows: In the event of a key
change" 16 in a corporation's structure, any manager who either par-
ticipates in bargaining with an acquirer, target, or coventurer of the
corporation, or who advises shareholders on the desirability or
terms of the key change must disclose any conflict of interest. Con-
flicts include arrangements with the bargaining "adversary" regard-
ing past or future salary, employment, or payments. If a manager
reveals a conflict of interest, then the appraisal remedy is available
to shareholders. Appraisal then serves both as a means of discover-
ing information about the transaction and about the appropriate-
ness of managerial behavior and as a way of discouraging acquirers,
who do not wish to see appraisal drain the target's cash, from offer-
ing side payments to their bargaining adversaries. If no manager
reveals a conflict, then appraisal is not available. Finally, if it devel-
ops that a manager failed to disclose or misdisclosed a conflict-and
shareholders were therefore denied appraisal-then the burden of
proof in a subsequent fiduciary suit shifts to the defendant. Presum-
ably, the statute of limitations for discovering such nondisclosure or
misdisclosure and bringing related fiduciary suits will need to be
lengthened. "17 In short, since shareholders can use appraisal as part
of the effort to assess their corporation's value and the desirability
of the transaction at hand, they need not be unduly wary of relying
on unreliable managers for advice about fundamental changes at
issue. Shareholders also could use appraisal to discover information
about managerial misbehavior, including the unnecessary suppres-
sion of information about corporate opportunities. This informa-
tion will help in constructing a fiduciary suit." 8 If managers claim
to be reliable bargaining agents, but turn out to have misrepresented
shareholder interests, then it becomes much easier to bring a suc-
cessful fiduciary suit. Our proposed "disclose-and-be-appraised"
rule aims to influence managers to disclose conflicts of interest hon-
estly and carefully.
mation to a potential acquirer, negotiating for a side payment or for future employment,
than it is for him to trade with impunity on inside information in the stock market.
116. A "key change" might simply be defined to include all events that currently
trigger appraisal in at least one state. It would seem quite sensible, for example, for
managers to disclose conflicts of interest when proposing charter amendments.
117. Of course, if the statute of limitations begins to run from the time a wrong is
discovered rather than from the time it is committed, then no lengthening will be re-
quired. See 13 W. FLETCHER, CYCLOPEDIA OF THE LAW OF PRIVATE CORPORATIONS
§ 5886 (rev. perm. ed. 1980) (generally, but not always, statute starts running when
wrongdoing is discovered).
118. Shareholders will welcome such cost-cutting help which is likely to contribute
to the goals of such suits because fiduciary suits are relatively expensive to pursue.
Plaintiffs must know what sort of smoking gun to look for and where to look for it. The
information disclosed by managers will lead them in this direction.
1985]
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This proposed shift in the burden of proof for fiduciary suits is
really just an extension of familiar corporate law. Fundamental
changes and appraisal aside, if a fiduciary has a conflict of interest
so that self-dealing is an inevitable problem, as when Corporation
X, controlled by A, purchases supplies from A's wholly owned busi-
ness, then the law generally asks X's monitoring shareholders only
to outline the conflict; the burden then shifts to A to show that the
transaction was fair to X.119 Similarly, if managers are unreliable
bargaining agents in a merger, then shareholders ought to be able to
discover information about the true worth of the assets and oppor-
tunities involved, and leave management to prove the fairness of the
transaction in a fiduciary suit.
When should managers be required either to disclose-and-be-
appraised or be subjected to a shift in the burden of proof? The
question cannot be answered without some experience with fiduci-
ary suits in which plaintiffs are free of the burden of proof. It may,
of course, be a good idea in all fiduciary suits-not only in those in
which we suggest placing the burden of proof on the defendant-to
require the loser to pay some or all of the winner's costs in order to
discourage abusive litigation.120 One might wish for experiments
containing the appraisal-discovery statutes outlined above. The ex-
periments could range from statutes that called for the disclose-and-
be-appraised rule only in the case of a merger to statutes that listed
many fundamental changes and events as triggering the disclose-
and-be-appraised rule. In all cases, inaccurate or incomplete disclo-
sure would lead to shifting the burden of proof in a subsequent fidu-
ciary suit. Some statutes might incorporate a rule for these, or any,
fiduciary suits under which the loser paid the winner's legal costs.
In short, details can be fine-tuned once appraisal is linked with a
goal; but since the discovery goal is necessarily part of a larger en-
forcement system, we simply stress the value of thinking of ap-
119. Compare Sinclair Oil Corp. v. Levien, 280 A.2d 717 (Del. 1971) (intrinsic fair-
ness test applied when fiduciary is on both sides of transaction and plaintiff is able to
show real possibility of self-dealing through which fiduciary's benefit caused benefici-
ary's detriment) with Singer v. Magnavox Co., 380 A.2d 969 (Del. 1977) (in a merger
fiduciary standing on both sides of transaction has the burden of establishing its entire
fairness). It is thus possible to describe Delaware law as automatically shifting the bur-
den of proof to managers with dual allegiances, at least in mergers. In nonmerger trans-
actions this shifting may require some additional help from plaintiff. The plaintiff, at
least in a merger case, shifts the burden to defendant managers simply by complaining
properly. In contrast, our rule gives managers the burden of disclosure; only if they
choose to misdisclose (or not to disclose) does the burden shift in a subsequent fiduciary
suit. We think, of course, that our rule will lead to greater revelation of information.
120. We do not mean to express a view on the desirability of an indemnity rule.
Indeed, the matter is sufficiently complex that it is unlikely that one broad conclusion
about the "best" rule could be right. See generally Shavell, Suit, Settlement, and Trial:
A Theoretical Analysis Under Alternative Methods for the Allocation of Legal Costs, 11 J.
LEO. STUD. 55 (1982).
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praisal as a discovery tool rather than insist on one vision of the
ideal law of agency. Regardless of how a jurisdiction handles the
assignment of litigation costs or the identification of events that
should trigger appraisal, it is our view that the disclose-and-be-ap-
praised device can be an important tool for the regulation of agency
relationships.
Our proposal deals more directly and effectively with manage-
ment-controlled secrets than does present law, although it does not
deal with such secrets as ambitiously as it might. It is our view that
the synergy and, therefore, the desirability of a merger-to take one
important fundamental change--often may be known only to those
with intimate knowledge of the affairs and opportunities of the cor-
porations involved. These opportunities may be kept secret for the
familiar reason that their revelation can destroy their value if com-
petitors or even suppliers know the firm's goals. 121 A firm's market
value is not always a good (as opposed to statistically unbiased) pre-
dictor of its real value because the market by hypothesis is unaware
of the firm's secrets. If managers are good bargaining and operating
agents, then all works well. These secrets will be revealed in due
course, maximizing the firm's profits. Shareholders on average will
be satisfied-except to the extent that some will sell shares in igno-
rance of the corporate secrets-but managers will know better than
to part with their shares during these periods of silence. This con-
cern for, or even presumption of, valuable secrets explains the very
significant premiums over market price normally paid in acquisi-
tions. 122 Some observers seem puzzled or dismayed by these premi-
ums, but they are no surprise in a world where managers withhold
information from the public in order to complete projects profitably
and bargain vigorously for their own and their shareholders' inter-
ests. Findings that firms' "asset values" exceed their "market val-
ues" illustrate the same point about the importance of secrets. 123
If managers are not good bargaining agents because they are
looking for jobs with the acquirer or otherwise have conflicting loy-
alties, then the agency relationship that is the heart of the corporate
form is threatened. The problem is not only one of property rights
and wealth transfers-although it is obviously these matters that
most concern shareholders with inadequate representation-but
also one of economic inefficiency; managers corrupted by conflicting
interests may make less productive use of resources. Managers may
121. In the familiar case the firm must accumulate land to realize its goal. Sellers of
land may hold out and block the project, collectively discouraging future innovation if
they know that the buyer has a much higher use than they do for the properties
involved.
122. See supra note 93.
123. See Note, The Dissenting Shareholder's Appraisal Remedy, 30 OKLA. L. REv.
629, 641 (1977).
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keep secrets unnecessarily and delay innovations in the hope of
eventually "selling" the secrets and the firm's assets to acquirers
who may actually produce less with the secrets than the developing
firm would have produced alone.124
Again, our hope is that appraisal will sometimes yield informa-
tion about secrets or about the plans of managers, so that share-
holders will be able to evaluate proposed changes such as mergers
and will have a better sense of what sort of fiduciary suit, if any, to
attempt. Expensive as appraisal may be, it is surely less expensive
than a fiduciary suit entered into without focus. Jurisdictions that
experience too many or too few appraisal inquiries, however such
experiences might be evaluated, 125 can experiment with different
formulae for dealing with the costs of appraisal and with the prob-
lem of free riding shareholders.' 26 Secrets will remain a problem,
but appraisal might be fashioned as a tool to search for these
"assets."
Although managers' attempts to appropriate corporate secrets
may create greater inefficiencies, it is arguable that greater ineffi-
ciencies would be generated by anything that discouraged acquirers
from seeking to employ a target's old management. If appraisal, or
easier fiduciary suits, are triggered when target's management is
tainted with offers of employment in the surviving enterprise, ac-
quirers may back off or inefficiently ignore managers with devel-
oped human capital; the acquirers then would be forced to teach
new managers to learn what the old managers have already mas-
tered. This is certainly a risk of our disclose-and-be-appraised (or
bear the burden in a fiduciary suit) approach, but it is not an inevi-
table result. Shareholders who receive fair compensation when
managers disclose their side payments and unreliability will not
necessarily litigate and normally will lose fiduciary suits-however
the burden of proof is assigned-so long as the transaction at issue
was a fair one. There is, for example, no evidence that corporations
124. Of course the acquirer may also do better with these assets. The point in the
text is that the combination of managerial misbehavior and secrets---even in the absence
of inframarginality concerns-interferes with any assumption that an acquisition is effi-
cient simply because assets appear to be moving to the hands of the user who values
them most highly.
125. It is, to be sure, almost impossible to know whether a society is experiencing
the "right" number of lawsuits or appraisal proceedings. But there surely will be a
tendency to compare the number of proceedings under a new rule with that experienced
under the previous rule-and to object, perhaps unfairly, if the number has grown by a
large factor.
126. In particular, it might be sensible to charge the corporation with all of the
dissenter's costs if the appraised value turns out to be more than a given percentage
greater than the amount the shareholders would have received under the terms of the
transaction without appraisal. This strategy might be useful generally in thinking about
the assignment of litigation costs.
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often pass up efficient transactions with suppliers or customers in
which their officers or directors have conflicting interests-and yet
shareholders who challenge such transactions do enjoy a shift in the
burden of proof. While there is a real question about the magnitude
of inefficiencies that the disclose-and-be-appraised rule could cause
as compared with the inefficiencies that arise when managers seek
to appropriate corporate secrets, we suspect that commentators
have ignored or underestimated the latter.
Once corporate law's problems are viewed as agency problems,
it is tempting to suggest, as resolutions to particular issues, the for-
mation of new agency relationships. Thus, the following possibili-
ties might be considered: Independent directors could look over the
shoulders of inside directors and independent litigation committees
could review the termination of derivative suits. Similarly, an "in-
dependent representative" could advise and represent shareholders
whenever managers reveal a conflict or even whenever a fundamen-
tal corporate change is proposed. One might further hope that
managers would feel free to confide secrets to such an agent. Then,
after some investigation, this independent representative could ad-
vise shareholders regarding the wisdom of defensive tactics by man-
agement 127 and the desirability of outside offers, and when
appropriate could even bargain on behalf of otherwise scattered
shareholders. This representative also would be empowered and
sufficiently financed to investigate the firm, inspect for conflicts of
interest, and otherwise pursue and achieve the discovery goal.
Although we would welcome some firms' experimentation in this
direction, we have no way of knowing whether its benefits exceed its
costs. Instead, we prefer to look for a familiar arrangement such as
appraisal with which to pursue the discovery goal.
128
127. We refer to defensive tactics that are in the firm's interests and are not simply
motivated by managerial self-interest. Again, if firm X has a secret the exposure of
which would ruin some or all of the secret's value, then X is likely to be undervalued in
the market and an acquirer's willingness to pay a premium above market price certainly
does not mean that the acquirer can put X's assets to better use.
128. A brief comparison of our proposal with current California rules is worthwhile.
In California, a non-short-form cash-out merger between "related parties" is prohibited
unless all of the target shareholders or the Commissioner of Corporations approves of
the transaction. A stock-for-stock merger between related parties and a short-form cash
merger trigger the appraisal remedy for the target's shareholders and sometimes for the
acquirer's shareholders as well. This appraisal remedy is subject to a market exception,
and does not preclude a fiduciary suit. See supra note 99; infra note 130. In all these
situations, our proposed uniform rule is "disclose-and-be-appraised"-with misdis-
closure leading to a shift in the burden of proof in a subsequent fiduciary suit. It is our
view that some mergers between related parties are beneficial to all shareholders so that
a requirement of unanimity or of time-consuming regulatory approval has the potential
to harm all shareholders. Our disclosure scheme and a combination of appraisal and
fiduciary suits seem more likely to correct or deter wrongful (and inefficient) mergers
and to encourage beneficial ones.
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CONCLUSION
A clear focus on the credible goals of appraisal will not answer
all questions related to that remedy. Consider, for example, ques-
tions concerning the exclusivity of remedies: When a statute offers
appraisal, should it be interpreted as precluding another remedy
and, when a shareholder selects another remedy, should appraisal
be regarded as no longer available? 29 Although the resolution of
these questions surely is assisted by reflecting on the goals of ap-
praisal, there is more than these goals at stake. In particular, these
questions raise concerns about the advantages and costs of relitigat-
ing matters that courts or appraisers have already considered.
30
129. There are almost as many prevailing rules as possible permutations. A share-
holder could be: (1) allowed to bring an appraisal suit at the same time as a derivative
or individual suit for damages, or suit for injunctive relief (Le., no exclusivity); (2) al-
lowed to choose among the remedies by a rule that might be called "procedural exclu-
sivity"; (3) allowed the remedy of appraisal and no other remedy when appraisal is
available ("real exclusivity"); or (4) allowed only to ask for injunctive relief or appraisal
when the latter is available, perhaps because the monetary relief available in appraisal
should be regarded as a substitute for a suit for damages. These are not the only pos-
sibilities. Most importantly, and most appropriately from the perspective of the discov-
ery goal, when real managerial misbehavior or other fraud is at stake any exclusivity
rule might be overruled so that shareholders can litigate as they like. These rules can be
linked to the credible goals of appraisal. For example, it is arguable that under the
discovery goal one should be able to bring an appraisal claim followed by a fiduciary
suit, because secrets and misbehavior may have come to light in the appraisal. Indeed,
appraisal may be appropriate even after a fiduciary suit (a broad rule (1)), since the
appraisal inquiry may get at an issue different from that which has been litigated.
130. The choice of an exclusivity rule might hinge on responses to two familiar ques-
tions related to collateral estoppel. The first concerns the wisdom of allowing relitiga-
tion. Rule (1), supra note 129, can be faulted for encouraging relitigation and therefore
imposing duplicative costs, strategic settlement requests, and uncertainty on a party
that will not know what level of resources to devote to a first claim. A second proce-
dural question related to the exclusivity rule concerns voluntary or forced class actions.
If one dissenter chooses a fiduciary suit, can another go to appraisal? The argument is
almost surely an affirmative one but is beyond the scope of this note and Article.
As for the relitigation issue, it is possible to defend any of the rules listed above.
Such a liberal provision as rule (1), supra note 129, may offer minority shareholders the
right variety of tools from which to choose. Appraisal will be selected when other op-
tions are burdensome, but withdrawing these other remedies might destroy an impor-
tant corrective step in another setting. On the other hand, the procedural exclusivity of
rule (2), supra note 129, may offer all the tools but impose a type of res judicata by
preventing a shareholder who is unsuccessful at using one tool from simply trying again
with another. A rule (1) proponent might argue that the cost of such litigation is a
sufficient disincentive to the shareholder who would abuse these legal tools. Real exclu-
sivity, as in rule (3), supra note 129, is the most difficult to comprehend if not overrid-
den by the uncovering of fraud. Michigan introduced such a statute in 1931:
"Objection by any such [dissenting] shareholder to any action of the corporation pro-
vided in this section [such as a merger or sale of assets] and his rights thereafter under
this section shall be his exclusive remedy." See 1931 Mich. Pub. Acts 327, § 44 (2).
Courts, including Michigan's, indeed relaxed this apparent exclusivity when
"fraud," "illegality," or "unlawfulness" was involved, see Weckler v. Valley City Mill-
ing Co., 93 F. Supp. 444, 455 (W.D. Mich. 1950) (legislature could not have intended
the exclusive remedy rule when the transaction was not in good faith). Many states
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Nevertheless, it is surely helpful to understand the credible goals of
codified or initiated an exception to the exclusive remedy rule, see, e.g., N.J. STAT.
ANN. § 14A: 11-5(2) (West 1969) (nonexclusivity applies even if the corporate action
would be ultra vires, unlawful, or fraudulent as to dissenting shareholder); MASS. ANN.
LAWS ch. 156B, § 98 (Michie/Law Co-op 1979) (illegal or fraudulent as to share-
holder); see also Clark v. Pattern Analysis and Recognition Corp., 87 Misc. 2d 385, 387,
384 N.Y.S.2d 660, 664 (1976) (allegation of fraud, illegality, or bad faith not offset by
any clear corporate business purpose precludes exclusivity). Whether one is more com-
fortable with an "efficiency" or a "fairness" approach, it is easy to see why exclusivity
was relaxed in this way. Whatever the goal of appraisal---even inframarginality, for
instance-if fraud turns up during appraisal, one would expect a statute to facilitate its
exposure in order to encourage the recovery of damages and assure future deterrence.
At the very least, even if it is thought best to regard damages and appraisal as mutually
exclusive remedies, to avoid both duplicative factfinding (both proceedings require stock
valuation and inquiries into managerial plans and secrets) and "ex post forum shop-
ping," shareholders could be governed by rule (4), supra note 129. Rule (4) would
permit them to bring actions for injunctive relief, but not monetary damages, following
or concurrent with an appraisal claim. Thus, one proceeding would be about alleged
wrongdoing by managers and the other about valuation. Indeed, this is precisely the
route that the New York courts have taken thus far. See Walter J. Schloss Assocs. v.
Arkwin Indus., Inc., 90 A.D.2d 149, 152, 455 N.Y.S.2d 844, 846 (1982) (availability of
appraisal does not preclude action for equitable relief); Beard v. Ames, 96 A.D.2d 119,
120, 468 N.Y.S.2d 253, 258 (1983) (same). In short, real exclusivity is sensible only
when fraud is not discovered. When fraud is present, we might expect courts to over-
come any statutory instructions regarding exclusivity and allow suits against misbe-
having managers to proceed.
It is fair to conclude that real exclusivity (even when fraud is present) does not
exist. A few words of explanation follow in support of this tangential but strong obser-
vation of de facto nonexclusivity. New York, as noted above, has an exclusivity rule
under which shareholders may bring claims for such equitable relief as injunctions when
they learn of wrongdoing through the appraisal statute's operation. See Eisenberg v.
Central Zone Property Corp., 306 N.Y. 58, 66-67, 115 N.E.2d 652, 655-56 (1953);
Miller v. Steinbach, 268 F. Supp. 255, 270 (S.D.N.Y. 1967); see also cases cited supra in
this footnote. But we have found no New York case in which a subsequent suit based
on appraisal was allowed. (Note, in passing, that this is quite consistent with our de-
scription of the New York statute's pursuit of the discovery goal.) Interestingly enough,
in Delaware-which is clearly not a discovery state-a stockholder who actually
thought he had discovered fraud during appraisal was not allowed by the state court to
bring a fiduciary suit unless he withdrew from appraisal with the corporation's permis-
sion. The court's protection of in medias res or ex post forum shopping is thus quite
consistent with the suggested goal of appraisal. See Dofflemyer v. W.F. Hall Printing
Co., 432 A.2d 1198, 1201 (1981). The shareholder was allowed to pursue a federal
securities law claim in Doffiemyer v. W.F. Hall Printing Co., 558 F. Supp. 372, 386 (D.
Del. 1983). Arguably, since the basis for the claim is different in a securities suit, there
is no forum shopping or relitigation problem. But even New York denies damage suits
to shareholders who have brought claims in appraisal to prevent disappointed litigants
from reopening proceedings. See Breed v. Barton, 54 N.Y.2d 82, 85, 429 N.E.2d 128,
129 (1981) (denying derivative suit for damages after appraisal and noting duplicative
costs and possibility of strategic behavior).
On the other hand, if appraisal reveals managerial misbehavior it is hard to imag-
ine a court's ruling that no tools remain at its disposal. New York's experience already
has been noted. In Connecticut, the supreme court, after insisting that the statute
(drafted in part by Professor Manning) took exclusivity seriously, permitted a share-
holder to sue individually, as opposed to derivatively, despite the "exclusive" availabil-
ity of appraisal. Yanow v. Teal Indus., Inc., 178 Conn. 262, 284-85, 422 A.2d 311, 322
(1979); see also Dower v. Mosser Indus., Inc., 648 F.2d 183, 188-89 (1981), in which
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appraisal in order to analyze, fashion, and coordinate appraisal stat-
utes and other corporate law remedies.
the court stated that frozen-out shareholders could sue for injunctive relief following an
appraisal suit under the Pennsylvania statute, although in this particular case the share-
holders were denied the injunction since the court found a legitimate business reason for
the transaction.
Finally, although California's law denies other remedies to a shareholder who has
appraisal available, it allows fiduciary suits "if one of the parties to a reorganization or
short-form merger is directly or indirectly controlled by, or under common control
with, another party to the reorganization or short-form merger." CAL. CORP. CODE
§ 1312(b) (West 1977). "Control" is defined at id. § 160. Thus, a shareholder who
uncovers evidence of misbehavior during appraisal and then pleads correctly almost
surely will be entitled to both remedies, unless a court's interpretation of statutory lan-
guage (such as "parties" and "indirectly controlled") is exceedingly literal. See Stur-
geon Petroleums Ltd. v. Merchants Petroleum Co., 147 Cal. App. 3d 134, 139-41, 195
Cal. Rptr. 29, 32-34 (1983) (dissenting shareholders unsuccessful in arguing that the
situation triggers the exception to the exclusivity promulgated in CAL. CORP. CODE
§ 1312(b) (West 1977)). Note that California does insist on "reverse procedural exclu-
sivity"; once a shareholder brings a fiduciary suit, he waives appraisal rights. CAL.
CORP. CODE § 1312(b) (West 1977); see also id. § 1300(c) (in fiduciary suit brought in
the situations specified in § 1300(b), the controlling party bears burden of proving fair-
ness of the transaction at issue). We see, then, that apart from a rule of total exclusivity
of remedies, the four rules discussed above exist in practice in different jurisdictions and
can be explained as deriving from procedural realities and common sense regarding the
wisdom of relitigation. To be sure, a preference for one of the "credible goals" of the
appraisal remedy can influence the selection of the exclusivity (or nonexclusivity) rule.
For example, our own preference, in conjunction with the discovery statute proposed in
Part III of the text, is for a rule that permits both injunctive and monetary relief despite
the availability of appraisal. Again, we imagine that some shareholders could use ap-
praisal as a relatively inexpensive discovery tool with which to formulate later litigation
strategy. If the results of the appraisal yield no fuel for litigation, and the claimants are
nevertheless insufficiently deterred by the costs of litigation from taking a second stab at
the corporation, then, as discussed earlier, a jurisdiction could shift more litigation costs
to the losing party. See N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAW § 623(h)(7) (McKinney Supp. 1984-85)
(granting courts power to allocate appraisal costs against or in favor of either party).
In our view, this cost shifting is a better way to weed out overly strategic claims
than is a real exclusivity rule. On the other hand, if a shareholder sees no need for the
discovery step of appraisal and brings a full-scale derivative suit first, then exclusivity-
withdrawing the availability of appraisal from such a shareholder-may be a good idea,
see CAL. CORP. CODE § 1312(b) (West 1977), unless the dissenter is able to show some
new information that motivates the appraisal.
In summary, preference for an exclusivity rule depends on whether one worries
more about the dangers of relitigation opportunities than about the advantages of multi-
ple tools; the particular goal of appraisal influences this tension but hardly resolves it.
Apart from the group coordination view of appraisal-which suggests that there should
be no exclusivity because appraisal serves an altogether different role from litigation
against management-the other goals lead to similar conclusions. For instance, the
reckoning goal suggests that appraisal be available at key junctures; however, if deriva-
tive suits were regular enough to bring out information that is useful to those seeking to
measure managerial performance, then appraisal would be superfluous or unwise (be-
cause of opportunities for relitigation) alongside such suits. Note that in New Jersey,
which, as described earlier, has a statute that sensibly can be viewed as aimed at the
reckoning goal, see supra notes 76-79 and accompanying text, one court recently de-
clined procedural exclusivity. The target shareholder in a short-form merger had
sought appraisal and later asked for and was allowed to pursue equitable relief. Mullen
v. Academy Life Ins. Co., 705 F.2d 971, 974 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 101
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The disclose-and-be-appraised (or face a shift in the burden of
proof in a later fiduciary suit) proposal advanced in this Article
builds on the discovery goal, reflecting our view that the problems
associated with managerial secrets and misbehavior are the most
crucial problems of corporate law. But the other goals we have de-
veloped are also credible and they, too, address problems found
throughout corporate law. That the implications of these goals
often conflict with one another highlights the ways in which ap-
praisal law reflects the ambitions, the chaos, and the methods of
corporate law.
(1983). It is not worthwhile, however, even as an academic exercise, to tie the exclusiv-
ity rule of one state after another to the relevant appraisal statute and its possible goal
or goals. While the various goals suggest different exclusivity rules, one is always left
wondering how seriously to take the hazards of relitigation.
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